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ABSTRACT 
Most advanced economies have evolved into service economies with the majority 
of their activity and jobs being in the service sector. The manufacturing sector is also 
going through a similar shift towards services. Manufacturers are increasingly 
complementing their products with new services in order to satisfy a broader array of 
customer needs and increase the value of their offerings. This shift has offered significant 
opportunities to the sector and the success of major firms such as IBM, Caterpillar, and 
Rolls-Royce in competing through services has been remarkable.   
Despite the increased importance of services in the manufacturing sector, the 
academic literature is yet to investigate the many questions that arise under this new 
manufacturing paradigm. Perhaps for the same reason study of servitization is listed as a 
research priority in recent publications both in the field of service operations management 
and in the field services marketing. This dissertation covers three essays aimed at 
disentangling multiple aspects of the role of services in the manufacturing sector. The 
literature on the drivers and implications of transition towards services in manufacturing 
firms is limited. The three studies in this dissertation aim at shedding light on this issue.  
Specifically, the first essay looks at the innovation benefits of service transactions 
with customers. This paper demonstrate the value of services in getting manufacturers 
closer to customers and allowing them glean useful information from their service 
interactions. The second essay investigates the antecedents of service strategy adoption. 
We suggest that the extant diversification theory does not fully explain servitization and 
this phenomenon represents a unique type of diversification, which is likely driven by 
 ii 
different factors. Through econometric analysis of financial data over a 27-year period, 
this study explores characteristics of product, firm resources, competition, and industry 
that encourage adoption of service strategies in manufacturing sector. Finally, the third 
essay takes a deeper dive and focuses on dealerships, as service centers, in the automobile 
industry. It investigates the role of dealerships in the success of automakers and explores 
dealership traits that are critical for market success of an automobile brand.   
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ESSAY I 
THE INFLUENCE OF MANUFACTURING SERVICES ON INNOVATION 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the influence of manufacturer services on innovation. We 
propose that services in a manufacturing firm provide an additional channel of market 
intelligence facilitating knowledge transfer and innovation. Further, when the service has 
a high level of customer contact or knowledge intensity, it is a rich medium for obtaining 
ethnographic and context-rich knowledge of customers. By analyzing a panel of 1698 
U.S. manufacturing firms over a 17-year period we find that as a manufacturer’s service 
sales increase, its number of successful patent applications also increases in subsequent 
years. This relationship is positively moderated by firm and service-level traits that relate 
to the likelihood that knowledge is created, captured, and transferred between service and 
manufacturing. The results are robust across several methodological approaches.  
INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed increased service-oriented solutions being offered by 
product manufacturers (Neely, Benedettini, & Visnjic, 2011). Manufacturers increasingly 
provide services to accompany their products in order to satisfy a broader array of 
customer needs and differentiate themselves from the competition (Lusch, Vargo, & 
O’Brien, 2007). The success of large corporations such as IBM, General Electric, 
Caterpillar, Xerox and Rolls-Royce in the shift towards services highlights the potential 
of manufacturing service strategies (Cohen, Agrawal, & Agrawal, 2006; Kastalli & Van 
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Looy, 2013; Suarez, Cusumano, & Kahl, 2013). Caterpillar’s service network, for 
instance, is at the core of its competitive advantage and has allowed it to fend off 
competition from Komatsu (Colvin, 2011). Academics and practitioners have promoted 
the benefits of service transition as a migration from product-centric to customer-centric 
business models (Fang, Palmatier, & Steenkamp, 2008). We define manufacturer service 
offering as the provision of services by an organization whose primary business activity 
is manufacturing products. A manufacturing firm (or unit) that has added services to its 
existing offerings is referred to as a service-oriented manufacturer (or unit). Recent 
studies of this phenomenon has been focused on investigating its financial implications 
(Fang et al., 2008; Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013; Suarez et al., 2013). In this paper, we 
advance literature by investigating the spillover effects of services on manufacturer’s 
innovation performance. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some companies have successfully used their 
service interactions to obtain market intelligence and improve their products. Information 
Technology (IT) services, for instance, are increasingly seen as innovation sources rather 
than cost centers (Nash, 2014). Boston Scientific, a manufacturer of medical devices, 
sends its IT professionals to customers at healthcare facilities to acquire knowledge and 
new product ideas. Apple Inc. uses explicit procedures for managing and utilizing the 
knowledge obtained from service interactions in their Genius Bar, the company’s in-store 
technology support service. Our interview with the Genius Bar staff indicated that the 
repair crew were the first to discover the faulty camera design in iPhone 6 Plus devices 
(Apple.com, 2015). In another example, the after-sales service crew from W. L. Gore and 
Associates learned about a shortcoming in the design of vascular grafts during their 
   
3 
interaction with the physicians who used the product. The grafts tended to kink when 
patients bent their elbows or knees, limiting blood flow. Relaying this information back 
to the company led to the design of a kink-resistant vascular graft which was 
subsequently patented and introduced to the market (GoreMedical.com, 2010).  
These examples suggest that services may have a significant spillover effect on 
innovation. The knowledge gained from services also tends to be different from 
traditional methods of market learning as it is captured during co-production of the 
service and through deeper and situated connection with customers in real environment – 
similar to ethnographic learning. Inspired by this phenomenon, our study is focused on 
whether services systematically enhance learning and innovation in manufacturing 
environments.  
It is not clear whether the insights obtained from service interactions can add 
significant value over and above what formal research and development achieves. Nor is 
it obvious whether this informal route of knowledge acquisition complements research 
and development or overlaps it, resulting in a substitutive relationship. The information 
obtained from services is likely unstructured and may not be readily translatable to 
innovative ideas. Additionally, offering services divides managerial attention and firm 
resources between products and services. This can increase scope of search for new ideas 
but will decrease scale and focus. In sum, logic alone cannot determine whether 
providing services may boost or hamper a manufacturer’s innovation performance. Thus, 
we pose the following research question: How does offering services influence 
manufacturer’s innovation performance?  
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Despite widespread industry adoption and some emerging academic research, 
there is not sufficient nor unambiguous empirical evidence addressing how services 
impact manufacturers’ business (Bolton, Grewal, & Levy, 2007; Fang et al., 2008; 
Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013). Considering the costs and risks of migration to a service-
oriented business model, further research is required to understand the implications of 
service offering by manufacturers and factors that “separate winners from losers” 
(Sawhney, 2006). A nascent stream of research in fields such as management, marketing 
and operations has begun to empirically investigate the impact of services on financial 
performance (Fang et al., 2008; Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013; Neely, 2008; Suarez et al., 
2013). Yet, more nuanced implications of service strategies and different aspects of the 
role of services in a manufacturing context remain largely unexplored. Our study 
advances this literature by shedding light on a different facet of manufacturing services, 
i.e. their role in generating market and customer knowledge.  
Our study also contributes to innovation and organizational learning literatures. In 
the past few decades, scholars have greatly advanced our understanding of the internal 
and external factors that influence corporate innovation and generation of new ideas 
(Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Chesbrough, 2003; Damanpour, 1991; Laursen & Salter, 
2006; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Marsh, 2006; Roy & Cohen, 2016). Scholars have 
argued that acquiring knowledge from external sources is a requisite for firm’s success 
(Laursen & Salter, 2006; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) and that customers are one of the 
most important sources external knowledge (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). The 
literature on user innovation (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Lilien, Morrison, Searls, 
Sonnack, & Hippel, 2002; Von Hippel, 1998) also explains why customer knowledge is 
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valuable for firms. However, our understanding of the various mechanisms by which 
companies can access customer knowledge is limited. By addressing the role that services 
play in tapping into this source of knowledge, our study builds on and extends user 
innovation literature. We argue that services interactions with customers provide 
appropriate context for acquiring “sticky information” from customers (Von Hippel, 
1994) and first-hand observation of their activities, mindset, and unarticulated needs. In 
doing so, we provide rationale and empirical support for why services can provide 
knowledge that is unique and non-overlapping with other methods of market research. 
We also demonstrate the conditions under which the service activities are more valuable 
in providing market knowledge and thereby enhancing organizational innovation.  
We first develop a theoretical model, using organizational learning theory (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991) to derive the our 
hypothesis linking service activity to innovation performance, and then derive supporting 
hypotheses involving contingencies with various firm and service-related variables. To 
test these hypotheses, we combine U.S. patents data with the S&P Capital IQ's 
Compustat North America database and construct a panel of 1698 publicly held 
manufacturers for the time period of 1990 to 2006. The data are analyzed using random 
effects negative binomial regression model. We further evaluate our analyses by a series 
of robustness and validity checks including the Hybrid method recommended by Allison 
and Waterman (2002), instrumental variable estimation, and Granger causality test 
(Granger, 1969, 1988; Wooldridge, 2012). The results indicate that when service sales of 
a manufacturer increase, its number of awarded patents also increases in subsequent 
years. We further find that the positive relationship between patents and service sales is 
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greater for high-contact and knowledge-intensive services. We also demonstrate that the 
patent-service sales relationship is stronger when products and services co-exist in the 
same business unit within a firm. Finally, we find that the benefit of service activity for 
innovation is contingent upon environmental dynamism, with more dynamic 
environments rendering services more beneficial. Our findings imply that services can 
enhance market intelligence, yielding insights about product performance and helping to 
identify customer requirements. This enhanced knowledge can, in turn, be used to create 
new product innovations and associated patents.  
THEORY 
Services and Innovation 
In this section, we examine the effect of a manufacturer’s services on its 
innovation performance. Innovation is the “engine of economic growth” and the core of 
competitive advantage (Damanpour, 1991; Nagaoka, Motohashi, & Goto, 2010). It is 
widely held that a firm's success depends on its ability to acquire and exploit market 
knowledge (Day & Schoemaker, 2006). We argue that service offering allows 
manufacturers to connect with their customers in a different way and enhances their 
ability to acquire market knowledge by revealing hidden aspects of customer behavior. 
Service interactions are only one of many processes that firms can use to learn about its 
customers and their needs. We contend, however, that service interactions with customers 
generate useful knowledge that is different from what traditional methods of market 
research can produce.   
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To capture market knowledge, firms rely on various quantitative and qualitative 
methods such as analyzing sales and consumer behavior data, customer surveys, focus 
groups, interviews, product returns, and tracking social media. While these methods can 
provide insight into how to address existing customer needs, they may not be as useful 
for understanding unarticulated or complex customer needs, since the observation is 
outside of the contextual complexity of the customer’s real world. These methods of 
market learning use different media for capturing market knowledge. Daft and Lengel 
(1986), in their seminal study on media richness, argue that performance improves if the 
complexity of the medium chosen to communicate matches the complexity of the task at 
hand. For equivocal and more complex tasks, where there are various and potentially 
conflicting interpretations to the available information, richer media such as face-to-face 
communication should be used. Conversely, for simpler, explicit and codified tasks, 
leaner media such as written memos are more suitable (Barnard, 1991; Daft & Lengel, 
1986; Gattiker, Huang, & Schwarz, 2007). The theory also argues that media differ in 
richness depending on their ability to transmit multiple cues (e.g., vocal inflection, 
emotions, gestures), language versatility, immediacy of feedback, and personalization. 
Richer media enable transmitting complex information more quickly and effectively. 
Applying media richness theory to organizational learning, we can infer that learning 
about a phenomenon of interest (e.g. customer behavior) is affected by the medium used 
to obtain information about it. Richer media would allow the firm to receive richer and 
more complex information while leaner media only allow transmission of a limited space 
of information. For example, use of face-to-face communication with customer, as 
opposed to emails, allows the firm to receive information beyond words themselves, such 
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as facial cues, emotions and socio-cultural characteristics of the customer. Similarly, field 
observation would have a larger capacity for capturing complex information, such as 
unique elements in the customer’s environment, actual use of products, the role of a focal 
product within the broader frame of customer needs, as well as hidden and unspoken 
needs.  
If the firm wants to develop innovative products and services, it has to understand 
potentially-unarticulated needs, embedded in the complexity of the customer’s 
environment of use. Therefore, it needs to use richer channels of market learning. Most 
methods of market learning treat customers and their experiences in “solitude” rather than 
in the real environment where the environment, context, culture and shared 
understandings, interpersonal relationships and dynamics of events work together to form 
customer experience. Many interactions and contextual information would have to be 
ignored in the process of abstraction. Bruner (1991, 2009) refers to this approach to 
understanding the world as paradigmatic (a.k.a logico-scientific) method of knowing and 
sets it in contrast to narrative method of knowing. He explains that paradigmatic mode of 
knowing focuses on establishing universal truth conditions via abstraction of specific 
example to higher-level hypotheses and paradigms whereas the narrative knowing 
focuses on the specific conditions in which actions occur. The power of paradigmatic 
approach comes from its ability to find commonalities between events and aggregate 
many observations into a single law or theory that can be used to explain the world and 
make predictions. Having dominated Western intellectual inquiry (Rorty, 1982), 
paradigmatic approach governs market learning in many firms at the expense of other 
methods (Cayla & Arnould, 2013). 
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In making sense of reality, the paradigmatic method seeks to establishes universal 
truths and theories; and, in this process it would necessarily need to summarize the reality 
using a set of assumptions about the relevance and importance of different pieces of 
information. For example, a customer’s purchase decision would be treated as “reflecting 
the behavioral disposition of a general category or as an instance of a general law” (Cayla 
& Arnould, 2013). In the process of constructing these customer categories the observer 
would have to ignore details and peculiarities of each customer action or decision to be 
able to see the commonalities. Though powerful, this approach will be less effective 
when the phenomenon of interest is complex and arises from interaction among many 
elements. The nonlinear dynamics in such systems gives rise to the butterfly effect where 
small differences correspond to large differences in the final outcome (Bar-Yam, 1997; 
Dooley, 2002; Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999). As a result, ignoring of details and context 
in paradigmatic methods may “encourage us to rush to conclusions about the whole on 
the basis of knowing only a few of the parts” (Fuller, 2001: 281). 
Realizing these shortcomings, many researchers have concluded that 
understanding markets and customers, as complex phenomena, are not possible by 
entirely relying on paradigmatic methods of learning (Arnould & Price, 2006; Cayla & 
Arnould, 2013; Elliott & Jankel-Elliott, 2003). For example, Cayla and Arnould (2013) 
note the difficulty of the paradigmatic approach in challenging the preexisting mental 
models, and argue that the conventional methods of market research have failed to 
stimulate creativity in organizations and open up new avenues for innovation. This 
stream of research advocates the use of ethnographic approaches to market learning as an 
alternative founded upon the narrative mode of knowing. Ethnography is based on 
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observing how people live their lives with no prior hypothesis or attempt to make logical 
conclusions (Anderson, 2009). Ethnographic market research tries to understand markets 
from the perspective of customers. In doing so, researchers would visit customers in the 
real environment and capture narratives of their daily experiences.  
We argue that services have an ethnographic component, providing a new 
perspective into customer behavior above and beyond the traditional methods of market 
learning. Ethnography have been described as “observing people in naturally occurring 
settings” (Randall & Rouncefield, 2012). In many respects, observations made during 
service interactions with customers resemble ethnographic learning. Service interactions 
are powerful ways of understanding customers because the service provider and the 
customer engage in co-production, allowing the service provider to observe customers’ 
behavior, needs and experiences in the real environment – something that is difficult via 
conventional methods of market research. The service provider does not directly attempt 
to make logical conclusions about and abstractions of the customer behavior, but rather 
makes direct observations of people and things while performing the service. Corporate 
ethnography is founded upon the idea that events do not map to fixed meanings or 
experiences for customers. Rather, meanings are dependent on the context, culture, 
history and how events unfold over time. Therefore, it is necessary to observe markets 
from within, before an accurate conclusion could be made. Similarly, observations made 
during service interactions are situated and allows the provider to observe customers “in 
action”. For example, once a service engineer is dispatched to a customer site, they can 
observe the customer’s work environment, including the physical conditions, work 
behaviors, competencies or lack thereof, corporate culture, social interactions, and the 
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context in which failures or successes occur. Swan and Bowers (1998) notes that shared 
meanings of things arise from the interactions between people as they work together, and 
act toward objects. Shared understandings are formed as people interpret and reinterpret 
events while they unfold over time. Examining individuals out of context, as is the case 
with conventional market research, will not paint a complete picture of customer 
behavior.  
Services, in a manufacturing firm, facilitate learning by allowing the firm to 
access rich and situated knowledge of the customers that is not easily obtainable through 
conventional methods of market research. While the conventional methods seek 
understanding of the market by establishing universal rules and searching for conformity 
with a paradigm (Cayla & Arnould, 2013), the knowledge obtained from service is 
unique and can challenge the accepted paradigms.  
Service transactions are ideal opportunities for customer interaction. The 
intangibility of service necessitates stronger interaction between the provider and the 
receiver (Jacobs, Chase, & Lummus, 2014). Hill (1977) conceptualizes services as a 
previously agreed-upon change in the condition of the service receiver or their belonging. 
From this perspective, services often involve significant customer input and reciprocal 
transfer of information between the customer and the provider (Karmarkar, 2015; Roels, 
2014). Therefore, offering services could be a means for product manufacturers to 
strengthen contact with customers and tap into their sticky knowledge. Acting as an 
efficient market listening mechanism, services provide insights into the customers’ 
mindset and preferences, unmet demands, and opportunities for new value proposition 
(Rothwell et al., 1974). Von Hippel (1998) explains that customer interaction contributes 
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to the innovation process because customers have incentive to share knowledge with the 
firm in order to benefit from the resulting innovations, and have sticky knowledge that 
can only be transferred via close interaction. Often the users of a technology possess deep 
experience with and insight about it, which makes them key sources of feedback. 
Through services, firms can get closely in touch with their customers, engage them in the 
dialogue, and utilize their ideas and feedback for developing new product ideas (Foss, 
Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011).  
In a competitive market, satisfying customers and meeting their explicit 
requirements are not enough for retaining market share. However, as noted by Leonard 
and Rayport (1997) customers’ ability to provide new product ideas is constrained by 
their prior experiences and ability to imagine and describe potential innovations. Market 
researchers often find contradictions between what people say and what they do. 
Revealing these hidden demands requires richer contact with customers. For example, in 
an observation of operating rooms the researchers found that surgeons frequently moved 
their head, struggling for better visibility, while, they had asserted previously that light 
was sufficient in the room (Burrows, 2014).  
Studies on manufacturing services also find links between service offering and 
knowledge generation. Kastalli and Van Looy (2013) argue that offering services 
significantly improves manufacturer’s understanding of the customer's broader needs, 
which can be leveraged for designing new products and services. Customer interaction, 
achieved through services, facilitates the learning process and generation of ideas for 
filling the gaps between the existing offerings and ultimate market needs. 
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Services can also act as a medium for knowledge transfer in manufacturing firms. 
Suarez et al. (2013) point out that services can facilitate the transfer of product-related 
knowledge to customers, and knowledge of customers to corporate innovators. Moreover, 
service provision involves significant acquisition of new knowledge and resources, which 
can spill over from the service area to the product area. Kastalli and Van Looy (2013) 
assert that services in product firms can generate market and product knowledge, which 
can be utilized to enhance new product or service development. Gries et al. (2005) 
surveyed 173 German manufacturers in order to identify the sources through which 
manufacturers discover design flaws. The study indicates that a significant portion of the 
design flaws in product firms are discovered during service activities. The authors report 
that processing warranty claims and performing maintenance and repair services 
accounted for 43 percent of discoveries of design flaws, together, compared to only 25 
percent being discovered during manufacturing and assembly processes. The study also 
highlights the role of customers in design improvement. Unsolicited customer feedback 
accounted for 36 percent of flaw discoveries, while customer surveys only revealed 5 
percent of the flaws. Gebauer (2007) finds that the manufacturers who center their 
business strategy around customer support services also create a culture of innovation. 
These findings indicate that services and the resulting customer interaction can be 
particularly useful for acquiring knowledge and enhancing innovation. 
Through these interactions firms gain a better understanding of how their 
offerings are performing under real-world conditions, to what extent they meet customer 
requirements, and what improvements are needed (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014). Services 
performed on products have a strong potential for uncovering design flaws and 
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incompatibilities. Each used product is one that is tested by customers free of charge 
under real conditions. Product-related services, such as repair and maintenance, are an 
effective channel for obtaining used products and examining their performance. Sundin et 
al. (2009) support this argument contending that offering product services teaches the 
manufacturer how its products perform throughout their life-cycle. Services can also 
prompt development of other new services. Once a manufacturer adopts a service-
oriented strategy it gradually discovers new avenues for serving customers and expands 
its services.  
Services such as product consultation tap into the customers’ complex behavior 
and mindset, i.e., how they make decisions and value products. Tuli et al. (2007) report 
that business counseling services accelerate organizational learning by providing a deeper 
knowledge of customer’s operational environment and their specific needs. Similarly, 
installation and training services provide a better understanding of customers’ operating 
conditions, capabilities, and shortcomings. This knowledge would lay the foundation for 
development of new services or products in future. Repair services help shed light on a 
product’s performance in the field and its durability. Likewise offering other types of 
service can generate knowledge that can be leveraged for improving the product itself or 
developing totally new services. Sundin et al. (2009) provide multiple examples of how 
the reprocessing of used products, e.g. maintenance, repair and remanufacturing, has 
generated innovation ideas leading to significant product enhancement. These 
improvements encompassed product performance, ease of use, safety, ease of repair, 
maintainability and recyclability. To summarize, the experience and knowledge gained 
from developing and performing services can be leveraged to boost future innovation.  
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Hypothesis 1. For a manufacturer, increases (decreases) in the level of service 
offering are followed by increases (decreases) in the level of innovation. 
We next present a series of hypotheses that act as moderators for Hypothesis 1. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, we conceptualize organizational learning as a process by 
which firms expose themselves to useful customer information, receive and make sense 
of the information, transfer the information within the organization and finally convert 
them to inventions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1991; Hurley & Hult, 1998; Zahra 
& George, 2002). Using this framework, we are able to analyze the boundary conditions 
for the main hypothesized relationship and derive factors that may enhance or weaken it. 
Service is viewed as a medium for customer interaction that exposes the firm to customer 
information. Consequently, service’s contact intensity influences the level of exposure. 
Knowledge intensity of service will in turn influence the ability to capture useful and rich 
information and understand it. Understanding of customers, then, must be shared within 
the organization which is influenced by organizational structure. This learning process, 
however, depends on the organization’s motivation to scan its environment and 
commitment to learning, which is hypothesized to differ across dynamic and stable 
environments. Finally, knowledge cannot drive invention unless the firm has the 
infrastructure and capability to innovate, which is controlled for via a variety of measures 
as it is out of study scope.  
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Figure 1.1. Process Model of Organizational Learning and Positioning of Hypotheses 
 
 
High-Customer Contact Services 
In analyzing the relationship between services and innovation, service content is 
an important factor, as different types of services may vary in their likelihood of 
generating new knowledge. Here, we focus on the customer contact dimension of 
services which has important implications for the richness of the service medium and 
organizational learning. We discussed that the increasing complexity of markets require 
that firms interact closely with their customers to obtain a rich understanding of their 
behavior, and that manufacturing services provide a context for such interaction. This 
characteristic is more pronounced for services with high customer contact. According to 
media richness theory media with higher personal contact are richer (Daft & Lengel, 
1986; Huber & Daft, 1987). Personal contact allows parties to communicate a larger 
amount and variety of tacit and explicit information, obtain immediate feedback, and 
observe each other’s personal circumstances. In a study of call center operations in 
insurance industry, Jerath et al. (2015) found that the informational value of a telephone 
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conversation is three times larger than use of an online portal. They also found that 
customers prefer online contact for more structured inquiries and phone conversation 
when the inquiry is related to health incidents.  
Ethnographic learning occurs within the frame of close human to human contact 
for an extended period of time (Arnould & Price, 2006; Mariampolski, 1999, 2006). 
High-contact services provide the opportunity for dialogue and information exchange to 
take place between customers and the organization, enabling it to identify unmet needs, 
spark novel insights, and develop new ideas. Such a dialogue allows the organization to 
understand customer cognition, emotion and behavior during the service experience. In 
essence, high-contact services enable absorption of tacit knowledge via observing the 
context to behavior and richer communication (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). While, 
service with limited human-human contact, e.g. computerized services, will only be able 
to transfer explicit knowledge about customers.  
Recognizing this issue, many leading brands have invested in expanding their 
physical contact with customers. Mercedes-Benz has, for instance, created “experience 
centers” throughout the world, in an attempt to better connect with its customers and 
understand how the company can create more value for them (Payne, Storbacka, & Frow, 
2008).  
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between services and manufacturer 
innovation is stronger for services with high customer contact compared to those 
with low customer contact.  
 
 
   
18 
Knowledge-Intensive Services 
Another relevant dimension of manufacturing services is their knowledge 
intensity. Knowledge-intensive services are distinguished by the unique expertise and 
knowledge they rely on for providing customers with effective solutions. One of the key 
differentiators of such services is their knowledge-oriented employment structure. These 
services are largely delivered through engineers, scientists, and other highly educated 
persons (Eurostat, 2016). These individuals possess stronger cognitive abilities and 
deeper technical knowledge of the service being performed.  
We also know that learning is more effective when new information is more 
closely tied to existing knowledge. An important driver of successful knowledge transfer 
is the recipient’s existing stock of knowledge prior to the transfer (Galbraith, 1977; Ko, 
Kirsch, & King, 2005). In a study of process innovation in pharmaceutical industry, 
Pisano (1994) found employees learning from laboratory experiments is significantly 
stronger in environments where the underlying scientific knowledge is strong. Individuals 
working in a knowledge-intense environment will be better in learning and “connecting 
the dots” to arrive at innovative ideas and generate new solutions. Consequently, learning 
from external interactions should be stronger in knowledge-intensive service 
environments. 
Knowledge-intensive services are also characterized by a higher level of 
interaction between the service provider and the customer compared to other services, 
which makes them a richer medium for understanding customer behavior (Daft & Lengel, 
1986). Bettencourt et al. (2002) note that operation of knowledge-intensive services often 
require significant customization and customer involvement. Similarly, Roels (2014) 
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demonstrates that as services become more customized, best outcomes are achieved when 
customers are highly involved in the service development process.  
In a knowledge-intense service setting, exchange processes are complex, loosely 
structured and highly customized (Bettencourt et al., 2002). The desirable outcomes are 
less clearly defined and both parties need to engage in negotiation, discussion and 
knowledge exchange to shape the service (Mills & Morris, 1986; Skjølsvik, Løwendahl, 
Kvalshaugen, & Fosstenløkken, 2007). Xue and Field (2008) describe this exchange 
relationship as a coproduction process, where customer provides significant input and the 
service is produces through the joint effort of the customer and the provider. This tight 
interaction, in turn, can overcome the barriers to transfer of sticky knowledge and create a 
rich setting for learning (Szulanski, 2000; Von Hippel, 1994, 1998). Considering the 
above arguments, knowledge-intensive service settings provide more opportunities for 
learning and at the same time the employees have a higher learning capability. Therefore, 
we expect to see stronger innovation outcomes as the share of knowledge-intensive 
services increases for a manufacturer.  
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between services and manufacturer 
innovation is stronger for knowledge-intensive services compared to non- 
knowledge-intensive services.  
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Product-Service Organizational Proximity 
External knowledge acquisition effort needs to be complemented by efficient 
internal knowledge diffusion (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Foss et al., 2011). Presence of 
shared knowledge throughout an organization is a prerequisite of innovation and 
successful new product development (Dougherty, 2004; Özkan-Seely, Gaimon, & 
Kavadias, 2015). While offering services helps a firm to acquire knowledge about market 
demand, customer satisfaction and product performance, innovations can only emerge if 
this knowledge is sufficiently communicated within the firm. Communication among 
units and sub-units helps to refine the new knowledge and combine it with the existing 
knowledge in a meaningful way (Foss et al., 2011). Activities that are performed within 
the same unit or highly connected units will have a higher chance of providing 
constructive feedback to each other because of shared goals and language. Therefore, co-
existence of products and services in the same unit should enhance their interaction and 
complementarity. 
Mansfield (1969) argues that successful innovation involves tight connection 
between different innovating entities. Foss et al. (2011) highlight the importance of 
internal organization for successful use of external knowledge. They show that internal 
communication mediates the relationship between customer contact and innovation. 
Newly generated knowledge may be fragmented and dispersed among different 
organizational members. This, in turn, necessitates collaboration among these entities in 
order to aggregate pieces of knowledge into meaningful, cohesive and refined ideas. The 
newly created knowledge might also include a large tacit component, which further 
highlights the need for close collaboration (Foss et al., 2011). Communication between 
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activities is facilitated when they belong to the same unit. Similarly, the services that are 
executed by manufacturing departments, rather than by standalone service departments, 
will be more likely to produce new knowledge that is usable for improving products, 
technologies and operations. The knowledge that is created through services in 
manufacturing departments is more likely to be well aligned with the firm’s core 
manufacturing business and, therefore, has more relevance and higher fit to the firm’s 
prior knowledge. When service and production personnel work closely with each other 
they will share a common language and their ideas tend to converge. This will increase 
the likelihood of cross-fertilization of ideas that yield subsequent innovation.  
In general, knowledge transfer is easier within a single organizational business 
unit versus between multiple units, and the personnel and processes within the unit are 
likely to have richer and stronger communication with each other (Tortoriello, Reagans, 
& McEvily, 2011). Consequently, we expect the services offered by product units to have 
a richer knowledge transfer with manufacturing activities and, ultimately, a stronger 
impact on innovation output.  
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between services and manufacturer 
innovation is positively moderated by the organizational proximity of 
manufacturing and service units. 
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Environmental Dynamism 
Finally, we consider how the firm’s environment may impact the linkage between 
service sales and innovation. We specifically focus on environmental dynamism which 
impacts organization’s information processing requirements and hence the effectiveness 
of ethnographic learning. The impact of environmental dynamism on the efficacy of 
organizational learning and innovation has been widely acknowledged (e.g. Jansen, Van 
Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Jansen, Vera, & Crossan, 2009; Wang & Li, 2008). 
Considering markets as complex systems, the level of dynamisms becomes an important 
differentiator that impacts both the motivation and the potential for learning.  
Environmental dynamism refers to the rate of change and the degree of instability 
of the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). Dynamic markets are more complex and 
uncertain. Market behavior and technology landscape change rapidly, rendering old 
knowledge obsolete and presenting new opportunities on an ongoing basis. Therefore, 
firms are encouraged to continually scan the environment, explore, learn, and adapt. 
Siemsen et al. (2008) note that high velocity of change makes traditional knowledge 
management approaches such as standardization ineffective. Rather, in a dynamic 
environment firms must constantly revise and adapt their practices by creating a free and 
fast flow of knowledge that continually converts employee knowledge into organizational 
learning. Exploration and obtaining novel information is shown to be especially effective 
in dynamic environments (Jansen, Volberda, & Van Den Bosch, 2005; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999). The unstable business and perceived 
competitive threats highlight the need for constant adaptation of strategy and encourage 
firms to utilize their available resources for learning and exploration (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, 
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& Voss, 2008). Therefore, manufacturers in dynamism markets should have stronger 
motivated to utilize the service channel for tapping into customer behavior and generating 
new knowledge.  
In addition, constant change in dynamic markets makes “learning at arms-length” 
more difficult. Media richness theory posits complexity and uncertainty of tasks as a 
major determinant of effectiveness of information media (Huber & Daft, 1987). The 
higher level of complexity and uncertainty in dynamic markets require use richer learning 
media. Efficient and automated methods of learning become less effective, while close 
observation, field presence and human-human contact become a key source of novel 
information. Encountered with a more complex reality, firms in dynamic markets cannot 
solely rely on traditional market research and need to complement it with ethnographic 
research. Ethnographic research allows a closer observation of customer behavior and 
appreciation of the context, processes, and causal and temporal relationships relevant to 
customer behavior. Only by obtaining this rich and close understanding of customers, 
firms can adapt to market dynamics effectively and in a timely manner. Consequently, we 
expect a higher level of learning from services in dynamic environments due to the higher 
potential and motivation for exploration.  
Hypothesis 5. The positive relationship between services and manufacturer 
innovation is stronger in more dynamic environments. 
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METHODS 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we combine financial and patent data for US publicly-
traded manufacturers. Financial data are obtained from the Standard & Poor’s (2015) 
Compustat. We use the North America Annual Fundamentals database as well as the 
Business Segments database from Compustat. The former contains fundamental data for 
U.S. and Canadian public firms, and, the latter provides historical data about business and 
geographic segments of over 24000 North American companies since 1976. Our analysis 
is limited to the manufacturing firms, i.e. the firms with the two-digit NAICS code of 31-
33. We use the NAICS industry classification system because it contains a greater level 
of detail than the SIC system, especially for services. We combined the North America 
database with the Business Segments database by the GVKEY (Global Company Key) 
code, which is the unique company identifier in Compustat. Compustat database contains 
financial statement and segment data for 6292 distinct manufacturing firms in the period 
of 1990 to 2006.  
We obtained patent data from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). The Patent Data Project (PDP) conducted by the NBER provides a dataset of 
more than three million US Patents for 1976-2006 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2015). It also offers information for matching patents data with major financial 
databases. The procedures used for constructing the PDP dataset are explained in detail in 
Hall et al. (2001). Matching patent assignees with firms in Compustat database is 
nontrivial since the original patent files provided by the U.S. Patent Office do not have 
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unique firm identifiers; a firm’s name can be stated in different ways or changed over 
time, e.g. due to merger and acquisition activities (Liu & Wong, 2011). For instance, the 
patents belonging to IBM are recorded under the assignee names “IBM”, “International 
Business Machines Corporation”, “International Business Machines Corp.”, and many 
more spelling and misspelling variations.  
We merged the Compustat financial dataset with the PDP dataset by the GVKEY 
code. Matching patent information was found for 4474 firms in the Compustat database. 
We applied the following data filtering steps to construct our final sample. First, all 
observations with negative values on total revenues, assets, service sales, and R&D 
expenditure were dropped. Second, observations with extreme values (i.e. below the 1st or 
above the 99th percentile) on total revenues, assets, service revenues, research and 
development expenditure, return on assets, return on sales, and the number of patents 
were deleted to mitigate the effect of outliers and mis-recorded data. The final sample 
includes 40,390 firm-year observations from 4467 manufacturing firms for the period of 
1990 to 2006. Within this sample, 10,551 firm-year records from 1698 firms had positive 
service sales value. 
Measures 
Patents as innovation indicators. Many scholars have used patent data for 
analyzing innovation (Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Liu & Wong, 
2011; Nagaoka et al., 2010; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Patents provide an explicit, public 
trace of firm’s knowledge creation. Patents have several advantages over the alternative 
measures of innovation. Large amounts of patent data are available on a global scale. 
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Patents are also very rich sources of data. Besides the description of the invented article, 
they include information about the inventor, the applicant/assignee, application and grant 
dates, references to other patent and non-patent documents (e.g. academic papers), and 
technology classes based on the International Patent Classification. Patents are the only 
source of innovation data that is systematically screened by governmental agencies over a 
long period of time. This unique combination of detail, objectivity, and coverage makes 
patents data well suited for econometric analysis.  
The use of patents is particularly useful for our study since it indicates the initial 
stage of innovation. Given that our empirical exercise is directed at exploring the link 
between service offering and generation of innovative ideas, it is important to closely 
measure the rate of idea development, which is reflected in the number of patent 
applications. Other measures of innovation that reflect final outcomes, e.g. new product 
count, would be temporally more distant from knowledge creation and contaminated by 
factors such as marketing strategy, competition, etc.  
A commonly noted issue with patent data is that the value of individual patents 
varies widely. Scholars have proposed that the number of citations that a patent receives 
reflects its importance, and therefore, the citation-weighted number of patents is a more 
suitable measure of innovation (Carpenter, Narin, & Woolf, 1981; Lanjouw, Pakes, & 
Putnam, 1998; Liu & Wong, 2011; Thompson & Fox-Kean, 2005; Trajtenberg, 1990). 
Following this literature, we weight patents by their citations. The use of citation data, 
however, introduces an additional methodological challenge due to the censoring of the 
unobserved future citations. This censoring is not homogenously distributed across time, 
as more recent patents are subject to more severe citation censoring. Hall et al. (2001) 
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propose a method for estimating the unobserved number of future citations. This method 
yields a correction multiplier to the citation count that adjusts for the citation truncation 
post-2006 and is available in the PDP dataset. 
The dependent variable, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡, is the censoring-corrected citation-weighted 
number of patents that are granted to firm i and applied in year t. To exclude the duration 
of the Patent Office application process, we measure patents at the application year. We 
only consider the successfully granted applications, not provisional applications that did 
not lead to a patent. The following equation shows the calculation of our dependent 
variables: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑗 . 𝐻𝐽𝑇𝑤𝑡𝑗
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖𝑡
 
where: 𝐽𝑖𝑡 is the set of all patents granted to firm i and applied for in year t; 
𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑗 is the sum of all citations received by patent j up to the year 2006; and, 𝐻𝐽𝑇𝑤𝑡𝑗  
is the citation truncation weight for patent j proposed by Hall et al. (2001). 
Service revenues. Service revenues (in original or transformed forms) have been 
commonly used to measure the level of service-orientation of a manufacturing firm. A 
challenge in measuring service-orientation is that firms do not generally separate product 
and service revenues in their reports. Consequently, services sales data are not easily 
available. Some scholars have partnered with companies to acquire service sales data. For 
instance, Kastalli and Van Looy (2013) collect longitudinal data from 44 subsidiaries of a 
multinational equipment manufacturer. They use subsidiaries’ service revenues 
(normalized to year 2000 using World Bank’s GDP deflator) as a measure of service-
orientation. Another approach is to focus on specific industries where companies report 
their revenues broken down into products and services. Suarez et al. (2013) focus on pre-
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packaged software products industry (SIC code 7372) in which around 400 firms were 
found to have stated service and product revenues separately in their 10-K reports. The 
authors normalize service revenues by the total revenues and study the effect of services 
on the operating margin. The above approaches, however, limit the analysis to a few 
firms or industries.  
Fang et al. (2008) develop a novel approach for estimating service revenues for a 
wide range of industries. Their method is based on identifying service segments within a 
company. By examining the description and the SIC codes of the operating segments 
reported in the Compustat Business Segment database, the authors divide a firm’s 
segments into service and non-service. By adding up the revenues coming from service 
segments, the authors compute the total service revenues for 477 publicly traded 
manufacturers. To our knowledge, Fang et al.’s (2008) procedure is the only method 
offered in the literature that is applicable to a wide variety of firms and industries. This 
method however only works for (a) a pure-service segment, in which case all its sales are 
considered service sales, or (b) a non-service segment, in which none of its sales are 
considered service sales. Therefore, this method alone cannot be used on mixed 
segments, i.e. segments with both manufacturing and service activities. 
Our approach for measuring service revenue (Service) is inspired by Fang et al. 
(2008) with two modifications: (a) it is objective and does not involve researchers’ 
judgment, (b) it accommodates two lines of activities for each segment, which helps 
better represent mixed service-product segments. The Compustat Business Segments 
database provides two NAICS codes (and their corresponding SIC codes) for each 
segment. We select a subset of NAICS codes as service codes. These codes, listed in 
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Table 1.1, correspond to the codes under the service category in the SIC system (i.e. the 
two-digit codes from 70 to 89).  
Table 1.1. NAICS Service Codes  
Two-digit  
NAICS Code 
Description 
51 Information 
52 Finance and Insurance 
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Mgt. and Remediation Services 
61 Educational Services 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 
 
The following rules are used to determine the annual service revenues for a given 
firm. If both segment codes are service codes, then all that segment’s annual revenues 
will be considered service revenues. If only one of the two codes is a service code, then 
50 percent of that segment’s revenues are considered service revenues. Our post-hoc 
analyses (provided in the appendix) indicate that the results are robust to the reasonable 
variations in the percentage used in this rule. The firm’s annual service revenues will be 
computed as the sum of the annual service revenues across the segments.  
Customer contact. We followed Chase’s (1978, 2010) customer contact theory to 
classify services into high-customer contact (Hi-Contact) and low-customer contact (Lo-
Contact). Given the lack of a complete and up-to-date classification of services, we 
employed a systematic approach to develop such a scheme.  
We base our approach on Lovelock’s (1983) seminal article in which he reviews 
and aggregates the literature on service classification schemes. Three dimensions emerge 
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from lovelock’s work that are relevant to measuring customer contact: the nature of 
interacting parties in service delivery (whether people are interacting or things/systems), 
duration of relationship between service organization and customers (e.g. discrete vs. 
continuous), and level of customization and judgment involved in service delivery. 
Indeed in their work on measurement of customer contact, Kellog and Chase (1995) note 
that the intensity of customer contact is not only a functional physical proximity and 
length of contact but also of customization.  
We define high-contact services as those that involve a high degree of human-
human interaction and customization for an extended period of time. Human contact is 
the foundation of the definition. Customization ensures that the contact is rich and 
involves is significant information exchange between parties. Finally, the length of the 
relationship impacts the amount of the information exchanged over time.  
Starting from the most granular level of NAICS system (6-digit level) we scored 
all service classes (366 codes) according to their level of human-human contact (1: very 
low to 5: very high), customization (1: very low to 5: very high), and relationship length 
(1: single transaction, 3: sporadic contact, 5: on-going relationship). Finally, the scores 
were added and a median split was applied to generate the two classes of low- and high-
customer contact services.  
Knowledge-intensive services. In order to identify knowledge-intensive services, 
we adopt the classification system offered by Eurostat, the statistical office of the 
European Union (Eurostat, 2016). The Eurostat classification distinguishes knowledge-
intensive service activity from non-knowledge-intensive ones based on the share of 
tertiary educated persons at NACE 2-digit level. These NACE codes were converted into 
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NAICS codes using the concordance tables provided by the US Census Bureau (2016). 
For each firm-year combination we computed the share of services that are assigned 
knowledge-intensive NAICS codes.  
Product-service organizational proximity. We classify services based on the 
type of segment they are located in. We identify three segment groups: (a) pure-service 
segments, which are segments that only have service activities, (b) mixed segments, 
which are segments that have both manufacturing and service activities, and (c) all other 
segments. The total amount of services sold by pure-service segments will be captured in 
the variable Service_Pure. The total amount of service sold by mixed segments will be 
captured in the variable Service_Mixed. The remainder of service sales will be captured 
in Service_Other. The following equation describes the relationship between service 
types:  
Serviceit = Service_Pureit + Service_Mixedit + Service_Otherit.. 
Control variables. Previous studies in innovation have demonstrated several 
variables that influence innovation which we have controlled for in our analysis. First, we 
control for R&D intensity (RDInt) captures firm-level differences in innovation effort and 
is directly related to the amount of new knowledge and innovation generated by firms 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Griliches, 1981; Pakes & Griliches, 1984). We measured 
R&D intensity by dividing the dollar amount of R&D expenditure by total sales. Second, 
we controlled for firm size measured by the number of employees (EMP) and the total 
value of assets (Assets). Larger firms have more resources and slack to generate new 
knowledge. They may also have a higher propensity to patent because they can more 
easily afford the costs of patenting and enforcing patent rights. Thirds, we control for 
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firm’s return on investment (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) as measures of profitability. 
More profitable firms may be more willing to protect their intellectual properties. They 
may also be more successful in generating new knowledge due to their more effective 
management. Fourth, we control for employee qualities that may impact knowledge 
creation. The capabilities of employees, reflected in their productivity, could have 
influence on their ability to generate, absorb, or transfer new knowledge. Consistent with 
prior research (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Guthrie, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Koch & 
McGrath, 1996) we operationalize human resource productivity with sales per employee 
– the ratio of firm sales to number of employees (SEMP). This measure is not without 
limitations. It captures the average productivity of employees. Ideally, we would want to 
only capture the productivity of employees who are engaged in knowledge creation 
process. Unfortunately, we did not have more granular data to achieve this. Table 1.2 
summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlations for our variables pooled across 
firms and time.  
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Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Variable Patents Service Hi- 
Contact 
Lo- 
Contact 
KIS NonKIS Service_ 
Pure 
Patents 
       
Service 0.311 
      
Hi-Contact 0.232 0.808 
     
Lo-Contact 0.195 0.539 -0.060 
    
KIS 0.271 0.740 0.474 0.576 
   
NonKIS 0.152 0.639 0.658 0.142 -0.045 
  
Service_ 
Pure 
0.194 0.342 0.246 0.228 0.285 0.182 
 
Service_ 
Mixed 
0.254 0.802 0.679 0.387 0.579 0.528 -0.036 
Dyn. -0.010 0.086 0.079 0.034 0.069 0.050 0.039 
RDInt -0.050 -0.144 -0.122 -0.070 -0.107 -0.092 -0.044 
Assets 0.299 0.453 0.353 0.262 0.362 0.259 0.309 
EMP 0.301 0.430 0.282 0.325 0.365 0.220 0.345 
ROA 0.092 0.223 0.189 0.108 0.161 0.148 0.064 
ROS 0.062 0.159 0.136 0.076 0.117 0.103 0.046 
SEMP 0.055 0.252 0.259 0.057 0.174 0.175 0.024 
 
Table 1.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (continued) 
Variable Service_ 
Mixed 
Dyn. RDInt Assets EMP ROA ROS Mean Std. Dev. 
Patents 
       
65.331 235.636 
Service 
       
0.063 0.127 
Hi-
Contact 
       
0.046 0.108 
Lo-
Contact 
       
0.017 0.073 
KIS 
       
0.035 0.099 
NonKIS 
       
0.028 0.085 
Service_ 
Pure 
       
7.797 51.740 
Service_ 
Mixed 
       
44.007 104.163 
Dyn. 0.062 
      
0.009 0.009 
RDInt -0.122 -0.102 
     
1.897 5.990 
Assets 0.171 0.031 -0.074 
    
0.599 2.151 
EMP 0.143 0.031 -0.082 0.778 
   
2.683 9.405 
ROA 0.192 0.020 -0.228 0.131 0.134 
  
-0.268 0.619 
ROS 0.137 0.091 -0.890 0.082 0.088 0.359 
 
-2.476 7.920 
SEMP 0.246 0.100 -0.234 0.189 0.054 0.201 0.259 0.186 0.206 
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Analysis Methods 
Our dependent variable, Patents, is created based upon a count variable (number 
of citations) and is highly skewed. The negative binomial model is commonly used for 
the analysis of over-dispersed count variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Hausman, Hall, 
Griliches, & others, 1984). It generalizes the Poisson model by including a dispersion 
parameter that allows the variance to be larger than the mean. We use the negative 
binomial panel regression models developed by Hausman et al. (1984) which explicitly 
consider the unobserved individual differences. Controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity is important in our analysis since patenting behavior differs across firms 
and periods of time. The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) was not significant 
favoring the random effects model. We also include year dummies to control for 
idiosyncrasies in patenting activity over time.  
We consider different lags between Patents and the regressors. The knowledge 
gained from service activities may take a certain period of time before it can be 
assimilated in the organization and be transformed into innovative ideas, actual 
inventions and ultimately patent applications. Additionally, this amount of time is likely 
to vary so we use 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year lags and compare their results as a robustness 
check. The general form of the base models is provided below: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡+1(2,3)
=  𝑓(𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 , 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠) 
Firm Effects include the random effects and Time Effects refer to year dummies. 
Hypothesis 1 will be assessed by examining the main effects of Service. Hypotheses 2-4 
will be assessed by comparing the effects of Hi-Contact vs. Lo-Contact, KIS vs. nonKIS, 
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and Service_Pure vs. Service_Mixed. Finally, Hypothesis 5 will be assessed by 
examining the moderation effect of Dynamism. The models are estimated using Stata 13 
(StataCorp, 2013). 
RESULTS 
Our main hypothesis, H1, states that the level of service activity is positively 
associated with innovation outcomes. Table 1.3 shows the results of the random effects 
negative binomial regression models for the main effect of Service using the positive 
sample. Models 1 and 2 report the regression results with a 1-year time lag between the 
dependent variable and the regressors. Models 3 and 4 report the regression results with a 
2-year lag, and models 5 and 6 report the regression results with a 3-year lag. The 
estimation algorithm adjusts the multiple series for lagged data. The effect of Service is 
positive and highly significant under all lags (1–3 years; p=0.0000). We conclude that H1 
is strongly supported. Based on the results from the first lag, for instance, we find that for 
every $10 million-dollar service sales activity innovation output of the firm increases by 
2.31 percent. 
Table 1.4 reports the results from the moderation analyses. We estimate the 
interaction effect of five variables under three lags. Hypothesis 2 states that customer 
contact positively moderates the relationship between service offering and innovation. 
Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1.4 indicate that high-contact services have a significantly 
stronger effect on innovation compared for all three lags to low-contact services (Wald 
tests: p=0.0057; p=0.0360; p=0.0047). Therefore, H2 is supported. 
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Table 1.3. Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results – Main Effect of 
Service 
  Patentsit+1 Patentsit+2 Patentsit+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.177*** 1.305*** 1.158*** 1.195*** 0.800*** 0.847*** 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.096) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) 
RDInt 0.440** 0.119 0.459* 0.139 0.571* 0.577^ 
 (0.161) (0.223) (0.181) (0.235) (0.272) (0.314) 
Assets 0.013 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.080** 0.027 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.036) 
EMP 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
ROA 0.233*** 0.174*** 0.182** 0.118^ 0.193** 0.136^ 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.064) (0.062) (0.073) (0.072) 
ROS 0.006^ 0.006^ 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SEMP 0.103 0.174 0.307 0.046 0.369 0.074 
 (0.177) (0.185) (0.210) (0.219) (0.261) (0.269) 
Service  2.280***  2.392***  2.576*** 
  (0.204)  (0.233)  (0.271) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -1.94e+04 -1.94e+04 -1.55e+04 -1.54e+04 -1.22e+04 -1.21e+04 
AIC 38884.056 38762.368 30960.669 30867.986 24354.883 24277.708 
BIC 39048.003 38933.146 31113.363 31027.319 24496.660 24425.930 
N 6844 6844 5647 5647 4649 4649 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that service knowledge-intensity enhances its impact on 
innovation. Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 1.4 demonstrate that knowledge-intensive 
services have a higher effect on innovation compared to non-knowledge-intensive 
services. The difference is significant in two of the lagged models; in one lag the 
difference is not significant but follows the same pattern (p=0.3129, p=0.0001, 
p=0.0007). We conclude that H3 is supported. 
Hypothesis 4 requires that the effect of service sales on innovation be stronger in 
mixed-service segments than in pure-service segments. As shown in Table 1.4 the 
difference between regression coefficients of Service_Pure and Service_Mixed in models 
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7, 8, and 9 is significant under all three lags (p=0.0000, p=0.0029, p=0.0050). We 
conclude that H4 is supported.  
Finally, Hypotheses 5 states that dynamism in the firm’s environmental positively 
moderates the relationship between services and innovation. Model 10 and 11, and 12 in 
Table 1.4 indicate that the interaction effect between Service and Dynamism is positive 
and significant for the first two lags; the difference in third lag remains positive but is not 
significant (p=0.0040, p=0.0090, p=0.9090). We conclude that H5 is also supported, 
albeit not fully robust. Figure 1.2 below compares the magnitude differences in the 
relationship between service sales and patents caused by the moderators. 
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Table 1.4. Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results – Moderation Effects 
  H2-Customer Contact H3-Knowledge Intensity  
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -1.323*** -1.189*** -0.971*** -2.918*** -1.185*** -0.970***  
(0.093) (0.096) (0.095) (0.100) (0.095) (0.095) 
RDInt 0.060*** 0.015 0.008 0.058*** 0.015 0.008  
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Assets 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.062** 0.015 0.061*** 0.081***  
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) 
EMP 0.012*** 0.006* 0.006* 0.017*** 0.007* 0.006*  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.117* 0.137* 0.133^ 0.147** 0.134* 0.132^  
(0.051) (0.061) (0.069) (0.052) (0.061) (0.069) 
ROS 0.038*** 0.009 0.003 0.038*** 0.009 0.004  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
SEMP -0.148 -0.251 -0.025 -0.585** -0.288 -0.099  
(0.177) (0.209) (0.241) (0.182) (0.208) (0.241) 
Hi-Contact 2.811*** 2.722*** 3.293*** 
   
 
(0.261) (0.294) (0.371) 
   
Lo-Contact 2.025*** 2.061*** 2.233*** 
   
                     (0.216) (0.250) (0.274) 
   
KIS 
   
2.236*** 2.876*** 2.954***     
(0.224) (0.258) (0.281) 
NonKIS 
   
1.958*** 1.727*** 1.845***     
(0.243) (0.278) (0.326)        
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log  
Likelihood 
-20644 -17301 -14377 -20874 -17296 -14375 
AIC 41340 34652 28801 41798 34642 28797 
BIC 41519 34821 28959 41970 34811 28956 
N 7265 6286 5417 7265 6286 5417 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Table 1.4. Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results – Moderation Effects 
(continued) 
  H4-Org. Proximity H5-Env. Dynamism 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant -1.209*** -1.145*** -0.814*** -1.145*** -1.021*** -0.897*** 
 (0.098) (0.103) -0.108 (0.083) (0.090) (0.095) 
RDInt 0.071 0.222 -1.018** 0.061*** 0.018 0.012 
 (0.234) (0.293) -0.352 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Assets 0.017 -0.016 0.072* 0.031^ 0.057** 0.058* 
 (0.015) (0.029) -0.033 (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) 
EMP 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 0.007^ 0.008^ 
 (0.003) (0.007) -0.007 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA 0.173** 0.115^ 0.119 0.118* 0.151* 0.149* 
 (0.056) (0.068) -0.079 (0.053) (0.064) (0.072) 
ROS -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.038*** 0.013 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) -0.004 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
SEMP -0.423* 0.058 -0.031 -0.146 -0.080 0.103 
 (0.208) (0.24) -0.308 (0.181) (0.216) (0.249) 
Service_ 
Pure 
0.407 0.522 0.157 
   
 (0.419) (0.601) -0.796 
   
Service_ 
Mixed 
2.183*** 1.875*** 2.108*** 
   
 (0.218) (0.257) -0.293 
   
Service 
   
1.891*** 1.786*** 2.666*** 
 
   
(0.262) (0.318) (0.371) 
Dynamism 
   
-7.841* -
14.776*** 
-10.552* 
 
   
(3.629) (4.327) (5.049) 
Service* 
Dynamism 
   
34.781** 38.515** 1.863 
 
   
(12.321) (14.664) (16.354) 
Year 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log 
Likelihood 
-12900 -10000 -7686.8 -18410 -15080 -12212 
AIC 25924.8 20069.1 15417.5 36870 30209 24470 
BIC 26081 20213.5 15550.9 37040 30368 24619 
N 4937 3931 3166 6636 5675 4838 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 1.2. The Effect of Moderators on the Relationship Between Service Sales 
and Patents. 
Vertical axis in all graphs is the log of citation wgt. patent count. 
High (low) levels of the variables correspond to one standard deviation above 
(below) the mean, or the maximum (minimum) observed value. 
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ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS 
We checked robustness of the results in several ways.  
Lags. First, we assessed the robustness of our results across different lag 
structures. As reported in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, results are robustness and consistent across 
different lags structures. 
Sample selection bias. As we discussed earlier, our original data includes both 
service offering and non-service offering manufacturers. If the two groups have 
innovation-related differences, exclusion of the non-service offering firms may introduce 
sample selection bias. To address this issue, we re-estimated all models with including 
non-service firms (we identified three distinct types of zeros and added them to the 
sample sequentially, yielding 4 samples overall). The service-patent link was also 
supported in these tests (Table A1 in the appendix). In the next section, we will also use 
instrumental variable estimation on the expanded samples to further mitigate concerns 
regarding sample-induced endogeneity (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 2016). 
Robustness to higher-order effects. Cortina (1993) shows that a moderator can 
also be correlated with the unmeasured nonlinear terms for the main effect, and become 
spuriously significant only because of this overlap. Following the author’s 
recommendation, we included the second- and third-order terms for Service in our 
models, but, our results remained qualitatively unchanged. Within each set all three lags 
and all of four samples are tried (yielding 24 robustness models in total). 
Model choice. While we believe the negative binomial model is the most 
appropriate, we also made comparisons with other alternatives for modeling count data 
including Poisson and negative binomial with fixed effects, random effects and hybrid 
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estimators proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002). Table A2 in the Appendix 
provides further details, indicating that our results are not driven by the choice of model. 
For brevity, only the first lag is reported.  
Prior patenting behavior. Following Blundell et al. (1995) and Schilling and 
Phelps (2007), we also control for the heterogeneity of firms’ patenting behavior due to 
differential knowledge stocks prior to entering the sample. Blundell et al. (1995) show 
that in patent data models controlling for the patent stock with which firms enter the 
sample adequately adjusts for the unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ knowledge stocks 
and eliminates persistent serial correlation. We used the citation-weighted cumulative 
number of patents from 1976 to 1990 to compute the Pre-sample Patent Stock as a 
measure of firm’s pre-sample accumulated knowledge. Following the literature (Liu & 
Wong, 2011) we assume an annual depreciation rate of 20 percent for the value of older 
patents. The following equation shows the computation of Pre-sample Patent Stock for 
each firm: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 =  ∑ (0.2)
1990−𝑡 ∑ 𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖𝑡
1990
𝑡=1976
 
Where, i is the firm index, t is time index, and Jit is the set of firm i's patents in 
year t. While Pre-sample Patent Stock explained a significant portion of the dependent 
variable, the effect Service remained positive and highly significant.  
Slack resources. Although our measures of firm profitability (ROA, ROS) and 
size (sales, number of employees) capture firm’s access to financial resources, we also 
controlled specifically for slack in the service-patents relationship and the results still 
held. In operationalizing slack resources, we followed Fang et al. (2008) and Lee and 
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Grewal (2004) and computed the common principal component of two financial ratios (1) 
retained earnings to total assets and (2) working capital to total assets. We used Stata’s 
PCA command to run a principal component analysis on these two variables and extract a 
single component. Retained earnings is the portion of net earnings that a company 
chooses not to pay out as dividends, but to retain for unforeseen eventualities and 
implementation of corporate strategies (Bourgeois, 1981). Working capital is the 
difference between current assets and current liabilities. Current assets are the liquid 
assets (cash, inventories, receivables, etc.) and current liabilities are the payments due in 
one year.  
Industry heterogeneity. We checked whether the results are driven by 
heterogeneity among industries. We included dummy variables for 2-digit and 3-digit 
NAICS codes, separately, and the effect of service on innovation remained positive and 
significant.  
A concern in our analysis is whether learning about customers necessarily lead to 
patents. As discussed, patents are not perfect measures of organizational learning. While 
patents highly correlate with learning and innovation, depending on the industry, more or 
less emphasis is placed on patenting. To make sure that our results are not driven by the 
differences in patenting propensity, we focus on the hi-tech sector where there is a greater 
motivation for patenting and inventions are actively patented. The high rate of innovation 
and fierce competition in the hi-tech sector, lead firms to patent even those inventions 
with unclear immediate usage in anticipation of long-term benefits. The results remained 
unchanged in the hi-tech sample. 
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Citation weighting and censoring correction. Another methodological question 
is whether the citation weighting and the correction for censoring affected the results. We 
repeated our analysis once using the simple count of patents and once using the 
uncorrected citation count. The main effect of Service remained significant under all 
models and lags. Using sales as a control variable instead of assets also yielded similar 
results. 
Service measurement rule. We examined the robustness of results relative to our 
chosen method for measuring service revenues. In the models reported above, we have 
assumed that when revenue is reported in a business segment with both service and non-
service activities, service revenues were equal to half (0.5) of the total revenues, i.e. equal 
to product revenue. We changed this weight parameter from 0.5 to 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, and 
0.9, and re-ran the main-effects models. The results remained qualitatively unchanged.  
Customer contact measurement. We also checked the sensitivity of results to 
the method we used for constructing the contact measure. We used multiplication instead 
of summation for aggregating the three underlying dimensions, and mean splitting instead 
of median splitting. Doing so did not change the results qualitatively.  
Triangulation of findings using text analysis. Finally, to triangulate our results 
and further ensure validity of findings, we measured service-offering in a different way. 
As a proxy for manufacturer’s attention to services, we used the number of times the 
word “service” is mentioned in the 10-K reports filed by a random sample of firms in our 
analysis. This analysis, reported in Appendix 4, also confirmed our theory. 
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Causality and Endogeneity 
An important threat to our results is the potential endogeneity of regressors. 
Endogeneity occurs when the error term in the regression model correlates with an 
independent variable and leads to biased estimation of the effects (Baum, 2006; 
Semadeni, Withers, & Trevis Certo, 2014). Our strategy for addressing causality is both 
theoretical and empirical. We first investigate the potential causes of endogeneity and 
how they might have impacted our estimation. Then we empirically address causality via 
instrumental variable estimation and Granger causality test. 
We have observed a positive link between service sales and patent activity in the 
next three years. Heterogeneity among firms or industries, if untreated, could cause 
endogeneity and bias. For example, firm’s infrastructure, access to resources, and 
supplier relationships may simultaneously allow it to rapidly innovate and efficiently 
develop services. Location advantages, e.g. being an industrial cluster, may have a 
similar effect. Also, some industries may happen to be both very innovative and very 
service-oriented. The consistency among the results from the fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) models mitigates this concern since the former eliminates the 
endogeneity due to firm- and industry-level effects and the latter eliminates concerns due 
to incidental parameter bias. Another concern is that over time US economy has shifted 
towards services, and innovation has become increasingly important. Even if these two 
trends are independent, their simultaneity may lead to a spurious correlation. However, 
our use of time fixed effects prevents economy-wide shifts from impacting the results. In 
addition, our control variables help prevent other sources of endogeneity. For instance, as 
a firm becomes larger its service and patent activity can both become larger. Diversifying 
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into services as well as pursuing innovation would both be impacted by firm’s prior 
performance and availability of funds.  
Another concern with our results is endogeneity due to time-variant shocks in 
business opportunities. For instance, new product development activity generates novel 
and patentable ideas. At the same time, these new products may require additional 
services to succeed in the market. In this case, it is the innovation that is pulling services 
with it rather than services causing innovation. First, we note that inclusion of R&D 
activity in our model can mitigate the effect of such an omitted variable. Second, the 
endogeneity due to new product development requires that innovation and patent 
application precede service sales, given that patent application can immediately follow 
R&D but development and successful introduction of a new service would take additional 
time. Our results hold even when service precedes is lagged by three years.  
Instrumental variable estimation. We use instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
method to empirically address endogeneity (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 
2010). The IV method involves finding a variable that is correlated strongly with the 
endogenous variable (instrument strength) but is uncorrelated with the residual variance 
in the dependent variable (instrument validity). Therefore, IV can only be linked to the 
dependent variable through the measured variables in the model (Wooldridge, 2012). 
Finding suitable instruments is often the most difficult aspect of IV estimation.  
We take two approaches to identifying instruments. First, we use lagged values of 
service as instruments, since lagged realizations are less likely to be influenced by current 
shocks. These IVs (hereafter referred to as IV set I) are service sales of firm i lagged by 
three and four years, ServiceIV1it and ServiceIV2it, correspondingly. 
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We only use the third and fourth lags to create sufficient separation of IVs from 
the current shocks. This choice, together with the existing 1 to 3 lags create a separation 
of 4 to 7 years between the IVs and the DV, which further enhances the validity of IVs. 
While past service activity is linked to future service activity (instrument strength), the 
knowledge generated from services is unlikely to impact patenting activity several years 
later (instrument validity). Unlike R&D, service interactions are not planned activities for 
knowledge generation. Rather, many ideas may emerge from interactions with customers, 
which only be absorbed if they are deemed clearly relevant to the business. Otherwise, 
they will be dismissed and not further pursued. In addition, knowledge is inherently and 
practically perishable (Schilling & Phelps, 2007), and, firms have incentive to use it as 
fast as possible. Therefore, service activity is unlikely to predict patent applications in 
four to seven years later. Even if an organization keeps some service-generated 
knowledge for an unknown reason, it will likely still need further research and 
development to be applicable to dynamic business needs. Therefore, such an effect will 
ultimately be controlled for via inclusion of R&D intensity. This approach to finding 
instrumental variables in not without limitations; although not very likely, it is still 
possible that some confounding factors retain their effect after 4-7 years. We note, 
however, that from an empirical standpoint the larger the time-lag between two variables 
the smaller the correlation would be. Hence we expect such lingering effects to be small 
if present at all. Yet to safeguard against their possible impact we use a different 
identification approach as follows.  
Second, we follow the IV identification strategy adopted by some studies in the 
economics literature (Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 1995; Bresnahan, Stern, & Trajtenberg, 
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1997; Nevo, 2001) and also used recently in study of manufacturing services (Suarez et 
al., 2013). This approach relies on the richness of panel data and utilizes information 
from other units (such as competitors of a focal firm) for identifying valid IVs. Berry et 
al. (1995) suggested that suitable instruments for price of a product can be obtained using 
data from all other products except the focal one. They argue that, in an oligopoly, 
pricing decision for a product is influenced by availability of competing substitutes. So, 
price differences reflect observed and unobserved product heterogeneity in the market. 
Consequently, once prices are measured and controlled for, demand for a product will be 
determined only by the features of that product itself. Similarly, in a study of cereal 
margins across brands, Nevo (2001), used product prices in other cities as instruments. 
Following these studies, we construct two additional instruments based on the service 
sales of all other firms in the 4-digit NAICS industry. The patent activity of a service-
oriented manufacturing firm is impacted, in part, by its prior performance, size, R&D, 
and service activity. However, it will not be directly impacted by the service sales of 
other firms in the industry. Rather a manufacturer is likely to respond to service activity 
of a competitor by adjusting its own service offering, sales composition, or R&D activity 
to gain competitive advantage. For example, Dell’s acquisition of the IT service company 
EMC in 2016 was made in competition with Hewlett-Packard’s introduction of cloud 
computing services. Consequently, any future innovation benefits that Dell obtains from 
these acquisitions will directly come from its new service business, rather than HP. We 
add the following IVs (hereafter referred to as IV set II) to our analysis: 
Competitor_ServiceIV1it and Competitor_ServiceIV2it defined, correspondingly, as the 
total and average service sales of all firms except firm i in the four-digit NAICS industry 
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of firm i. Table 1.5 shows the correlation between the two sets of instrumental variables 
and Service.  
Table 1.5. Correlation Between Service and the Instrumental Variables 
Set 
Name 
IV Name Correlation with Service 
IV I 
ServiceIV1 0.8275 
ServiceIV2 0.7807 
IV II 
Competitor_ServiceIV1 -0.1209 
Competitor_ServiceIV2 0.1998 
 
 
Given that our models are non-linear in parameters, control function (CF) 
approach is a preferred alternative to 2SLS (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Wooldridge, 
2012). Table 1.6 provides our control function IV estimation results. The estimate of 
Service remains positive and highly significant (p=0.0000) under all three lags, with and 
without zeros, and using either sets of IVs.  
  
   
50 
Table 1.6. Instrumental Variable Estimation of Random Effects Negative Binomial 
Model Using Samples I and IV 
  IV I-Sample I IV I-Sample IV 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -1.364*** -1.261*** -1.160*** -1.469*** -1.266*** -0.914*** 
 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.095 -0.101 -0.105 
RDInt 0.047*** 0.013 0.003 0.060*** 0.035* 0.037* 
 -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
Assets 0.003 0.010^ 0.005 -0.042** -0.048* -0.007 
 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.015 -0.021 -0.034 
EMP 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.013^ 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
ROA 0.310*** 0.348*** 0.396*** 0.06 0.027 0.036 
 -0.039 -0.045 -0.05 -0.053 -0.063 -0.073 
ROS 0.025*** 0.001 -0.007 0.037** 0.022^ 0.025^ 
 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 
SEMP 0.076 0.098 0.341** -0.076 -0.028 -0.24 
 -0.087 -0.094 -0.118 -0.182 -0.219 -0.272 
Residual -2.693*** -2.801*** -3.035*** -3.125*** -3.200*** -4.173*** 
 -0.235 -0.251 -0.276 -0.356 -0.409 -0.469 
Service 2.560*** 2.467*** 2.618*** 3.537*** 3.723*** 4.334*** 
 -0.197 -0.216 -0.24 -0.243 -0.288 -0.346 
Year  
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log  
Likelihood 
-72650 -62578 -53428 -18957 -15132 -11923 
AIC 145353 125205 106903 37966 30314 23895 
BIC 145563 125404 107091 38143 30480 24049 
N 24358 21258 18523 6726 5560 4586 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Sample I: with all zero observations on service sales; Sample IV: with no zeros. 
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Table 1.6.  Instrumental Variable Estimation of Random Effects Negative Binomial 
Model Using Samples I and IV (continued) 
  
  
IV II-Sample I IV II-Sample I 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant -0.905*** -0.925*** -0.732*** -0.609*** -0.740*** -0.447** 
 -0.046 -0.05 -0.053 -0.122 -0.137 -0.155 
RDInt 0.067*** 0.023 0.007 0.074** 0.009 -0.011 
 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 -0.027 -0.029 -0.035 
Assets -0.021** -0.006 -0.001 -0.071 0.014 0.014 
 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.044 -0.063 -0.085 
EMP 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028^ 0.006 0.002 
 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 -0.018 -0.021 
ROA 0.387*** 0.424*** 0.571*** 0.128 0.009 0.177 
 -0.06 -0.074 -0.091 -0.091 -0.111 -0.145 
ROS 0.040** 0.008 -0.008 0.048* -0.001 -0.028 
 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.023 -0.027 -0.033 
SEMP 0.392** 0.521*** 0.744*** -0.313 0.125 0.16 
 -0.125 -0.145 -0.165 -0.343 -0.418 -0.504 
Residual -1.877*** -1.961*** -2.074*** -5.458*** -4.420*** -3.548*** 
 -0.343 -0.375 -0.409 -0.656 -0.748 -0.864 
Service 2.288*** 2.511*** 2.775*** 4.425*** 4.261*** 4.598*** 
 -0.243 -0.276 -0.317 -0.408 -0.494 -0.655 
Year  
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log  
Likelihood 
-38202 -30693 -24448 -7039 -5192 -3728 
AIC 76448 61428 48936 14122 10426 7497 
BIC 76614 61583 49080 14254 10548 7608 
N 14106 11901 10012 3042 2423 1920 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
Sample I: with all zero observations on service sales; Sample IV: with no zeros. 
 
Recently, Suarez et al. (2015) followed a similar strategy for instrumenting 
service sales of manufacturing firms. They used the aggregate and mean values of 
competitor employees and sales as instruments for estimating the effect of services on 
operating margin (four instruments in total). To gain further assurance regarding our 
treatment of endogeneity, we also used the same IVs employed by Suarez et al. (2015) in 
our main effect model and found similarly strong support for our hypothesis. 
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Granger causality. To test another aspect of causality (the necessary conditions) 
we ran a Granger causality test which tests whether the predictor (Service) contains 
unique information about the dependent variable (Patents) over and above the current and 
past realizations of the DV and all other control variables. This test, reported in Appendix 
3, also supported our hypothesis.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Many manufacturers have realized that competition in the global market is not 
limited to products. This has ignited a race among manufacturers to offer services and 
integrated product-service solutions (Neely et al., 2011). Services can create new 
channels of communication with the market and customers. We argue that service 
offering can enhance innovation by providing manufacturers with new, and potentially 
richer, sources of knowledge and market intelligence. Proper use of such sources can 
generate knowledge of how the existing products and services are performing against 
market needs, which attributes are most critical to improve, and what new offerings can 
be developed to satisfy unmet and often unarticulated customer needs. The current paper 
is the first to use a large-scale study to empirically examine innovation in service-
oriented manufacturing organizations.  
We analyzed 17 years of data (1990-2006) from publicly-traded manufacturers in 
the US using random effects negative binomial regression. The results indicate a strong 
and robust association between services and innovation. For service-offering 
manufacturers, change in the level of service sales is positively associated with change in 
the citation-weighted number of patents in all three subsequent years. This finding 
   
53 
portrays services as a channel for accessing knowledge and boosting innovation in 
manufacturing firms. Services extend manufacturers’ contact with the market and enable 
a richer communication with customers. Manufacturers who wish to enhance their 
innovation outcomes can leverage the potential of services to absorb external knowledge 
and uncover new aspects of complex customer behavior.  
This result also provides a potential explanation for the bridge decay phenomenon 
in service outsourcing (Li & Choi, 2009). Li and Choi (2009) argued that service 
outsourcing can lead to degradation of a firm’s position as a bridge between the supplier 
and customers and eventually loss of control over the service interactions between the 
two parties. Our study empirically shows that service interactions can generate valuable 
insights for manufacturers, over and above what is achieved via R&D. Outsourcing 
services limits a manufacturer’s direct contact with the customers and leaves strategic 
information in the hands of suppliers. Consequently, power dynamics may change to 
increase supplier’s influence in the triad. Manufacturers should take into account the cost 
of lost intelligence and the risk of supplier opportunism in their service outsourcing 
decisions. Proper use of coordination mechanisms can mitigate this loss for the 
manufacturer. For instance, if Apple were to outsource its repair operations it would lose 
the early and first-hand knowledge of design flaws at the time of new product launch. 
Alternatively, Apple can work with the service supplier to develop processes in which 
supplier collects and shares information about product failures and repair requests. 
Notably, such a sharing mechanism works better for explicit knowledge, which can be 
easily codified and transferred, compared tacit knowledge, which may better capture the 
contextual complexity of the opportunity space.  
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As noted by Kamarkar (2015), customer’s involvement in the service co-
production means that their behavior is not only a marketing object but an operational 
object, therefore thinking of customers solely as purchasers is not adequate. Expanding 
this view, our results suggest that the co-production of service also allows the firm to 
learn about the customer and adjust its operations to better match customer needs. 
Therefore, services are not only channels of delivering value but also channels for 
information reception.  
Studies (e.g., Tucker, 2007) have found the frontline service staff can contribute 
innovative solutions to process improvement efforts due to their closeness to the actual 
operations and failure points. Our study implies that service staff can also contribute 
significantly to inventive efforts. In addition, the analysis results suggest that the 
innovation value of service offering depends on features of the services, organization of 
services in relation to manufacturing activity, and the firm’s environment. High-customer 
contact and knowledge-intensive services are especially more valuable in generating 
ethnographic knowledge. Our study also highlights a positive side of customer contact for 
operations management. Many studies in operations management consider higher service 
contact as being detrimental to performance; while, more recent findings suggest a more 
complex effect for contact intensity and customization on operational performance 
(Bitran, Ferrer, & Rocha e Oliveira, 2008; Kumar & Telang, 2011). We show that longer 
customer contact has positive outcomes for organizational learning, which can lead to 
improved operational performance in the longer term. Future research can build on this 
findings and disentangle the short- and long-term implications of service contact for 
operations performance and customer outcomes. Notably predicting the effects of 
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automation on performance in service delivery may not be as clear as it is in 
manufacturing. Reduction of customer contact during automation may lead to loss of key 
customer information and opportunities for future business. 
We also found that proximity of service and manufacturing activities, both 
organizational and geographic, improves the innovation outcomes of service offering. 
Organizational proximity can indicate relatedness of the content of activities and 
smoother interaction between them. Communication of tacit knowledge or new ideas, for 
instance, can be significantly harder when in-person interaction is limited or business 
routines are different. This finding suggests that rich communication between service and 
manufacturing activities is more important for innovation performance of a service-
oriented manufacturer than for a traditional manufacturer. Also, relatedness of service 
and production activities means that the knowledge absorbed from the market during 
service activities will be more relevant to product development and manufacturing 
activities. The higher relevance of information coupled with the added benefit of richer 
and more frequent interaction between employees make organizational proximity 
especially important for spillover between service and manufacturing activities.  
We also demonstrate the knowledge value of services are significantly larger in 
dynamic markets. In such environments, constant obsolescence of knowledge makes 
learning especially important and the larger number of unknowns offers more 
opportunities for learning. Meanwhile, due to higher complexity the most useful 
information is one that is context-aware and rich in detail. Hence, ethnographic learning 
offered by service activities become more valuable and effective. 
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We acknowledge that our study suffers from several limitations. First, we do not 
directly observe the learning and knowledge absorption that occurs because of service 
offering. While our theory suggests knowledge transfer is the mediating mechanism, 
there may also be other mechanisms by which services are linked to innovation. For 
instance, a differentiation strategy may induce higher emphasis on innovation as well as 
on superior service. Our adjustments for firm-specific effects, time effects, firm’s past 
patenting behavior as well as instrumental variable estimation aimed at mitigating such 
influences. In addition, the harmony between the empirical results is helpful in 
strengthening confidence in the proposed mechanism. All of the five hypotheses depend 
on the ethnographic knowledge transfer mechanism. Therefore, if another mechanism 
were responsible for the findings it would have likely manifested in weak results for 
some of the hypotheses. In essence, each of the seven findings add a separate layer of 
support for the common underlying mechanism. 
Second, in absence of a direct measure of service sales, we needed to estimate the 
fraction of total revenue due to services. Our assumption that product and service 
revenues are equal is unbiased with respect to our hypotheses, and the use of multiple 
observations of the same firms further mitigates any potential bias. Moreover, lower 
reliability in a regressor will attenuate the regression coefficient of that regressor, all else 
equal, and make the results more conservative (Liu, 1988). Our robustness check 
indicated that results were consistent under different weightings between product and 
service revenue. Finally, triangulation of findings using the textual measure of service-
orientation provides further support for the results.  
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ESSAY II 
DIVERSIFICATION OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS INTO SERVICES:  
ANALYSIS OF ANTECEDENTS 
ABSTRACT 
Manufacturers are increasingly complementing their products with new services 
in order to satisfy a broader array of customer needs and increase the value of their 
offerings. A manufacturer’s diversification into services (i.e. “servitization”) requires a 
significant organizational transformation and has been shown to be a very challenging 
process. However, our understanding of the factors that motivate a manufacturer to 
diversify into the service arena is limited. This paper empirically investigates the drivers 
of servitization by manufacturing firms. We suggest that servitization represents a new 
type of diversification which cannot be fully explained by the extant diversification 
theory unless critical customer-related elements are considered in the theory. We 
construct a sample of 2450 public manufacturing firms for the period of 1976 to 2006 by 
combining financial statement data and patent data and analyze it using multilevel 
regression models. We find that firms in industries characterized with high technology or 
firms in their earlier life cycle stage offer a higher level of service. We also demonstrate 
that a larger market share and larger stock of proprietary knowledge encourage 
manufacturers to introduce more services. Our results are robust and consistent under 
multiple lag structures and extend theoretical precision in explaining servitization.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturers have increasingly introduced services to accompany their existing 
products in order to satisfy a broader array of customer needs and differentiate 
themselves from the competition (Lusch et al., 2007; Sawhney, Balasubramanian, & 
Krishnan, 2003). These services include repair and maintenance, warranties, installation, 
financial services, consulting, training, product analytics, performance monitoring, etc. 
This phenomenon is frequently referred to as “servitization” (Vandermerwe & Rada, 
1988). In this study, we define servitization as the provision of services by an 
organization whose primary business activity is manufacturing products. A 
manufacturing firm (or unit) that has added services to its existing offerings is referred to 
as a servitized firm (or unit). 
Servitization can be a means to achieve sustainable competitive advantage and 
counteract commoditization. Value-added services transform commodities to 
differentiated goods (Bowen, Siehl, & Schneider, 1989); they create synergies with the 
existing products which cannot be achieved by pure service or pure product firms. 
Portfolios of products and services are harder to imitate (Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, 
& Kay, 2009; Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013). Porter (1980) views service as an important 
element of product strategy. He argues that superior customer service, financing facilities, 
and logistics services can enhance value offering and increase the cost of switching for 
customers. Therefore services can also be used to lock-in customers and lock-out 
competitors (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988).  
Servitization has been a popular strategy in the manufacturing sector. In almost 
every manufacturing industry a growing portion of firms are complementing their 
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products with value-added services (Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, et al., 2009; Fang et 
al., 2008; Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988; Wise & Baumgartner, 1999). Yet, despite wide 
industry adoption and the claimed benefits, many manufacturers have refrained from 
stepping into the uncharted territory of services (Cohen et al., 2006; Oliva and 
Kallenberg, 2003). In order to successfully develop and deliver services, a manufacturer 
must go through an organizational transformation, develop a service-centric culture, 
acquire new resources, and train employees. Such a bold transition has often proved to be 
a tough challenge and would requires strong motivation (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003). It 
is not clearly understood why some manufacturers choose to, or are able to, make the 
transition from products to services while others do not. While diversification theory 
offered insights into why manufacturers enter services, we argue that there exists certain 
customer-side elements that are critical to servitization decision but ignored in the extant 
theory.  
The main goal of this study is to develop a theory of servitization. This study is 
concerned with the following research question: What factors motivate a manufacturing 
firm to develop and offer services? In order to address this question, we use S&P Capital 
IQ's Compustat North America database as well as patent data construct a panel of 2450 
publicly held manufacturers for the time period of 1976 to 2006. We analyze this data 
using multi-level regression analysis.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
There exists limited empirical evidence in servitization literature with regards to 
the drivers of the phenomenon. Diversification literature also seems to ignore important 
aspects of servitization. Below we will discuss the insights that could be gained from 
each stream of literature. 
Servitization 
Since the introduction of servitization to the literature (Vandermerwe & Rada, 
1988) research has been steadily growing in this area (Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, et 
al., 2009). Academic research emphasized servitization’s marketing-related benefits 
(DeBruicker & Summe, 1985; Hull & Cox, 1994; Lele & Karmarkar, 1983) as well as 
operations issues (Armistead & Clark, 1991; Goffin & New, 2001; Loomba, 1996). 
Scholars have suggested that there is great potential for manufacturers in integrating 
services into their core products (Baines, Lightfoot, Peppard, et al., 2009; Baines, 
Lightfoot, Benedettini, et al., 2009; Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003; Wise & Baumgartner, 
1999). Following prior empirical work (Fang et al., 2008; Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013; 
Suarez et al., 2013) we study servitization at the organization level and focus on all 
services sold by manufacturers.  
Drivers of Servitization. Examination of previous research reveals a number of 
factors that potentially motivate manufacturers to adopt service strategies. Suarez et al. 
(2013) argue that decline of product revenues encourages manufacturers to diversify into 
services. The desire for differentiation is another factor that is emphasized as a reason for 
servitization (Lusch et al., 2007; Sawhney, 2004; Wise & Baumgartner, 1999). Kastalli 
   
61 
and Van Looy (2013) state that manufacturers develop services in order to escape the 
commoditization trap. The competition in the manufacturing sector has led to 
commoditization of many product categories. Consequently, some manufacturers have 
shifted focus to services as a new basis for differentiation. Servitization may also be 
explained by complementarity between manufacturing and service activities. The 
availability of excess capacity in immobile production resources, such as knowledge and 
facilities, can motivate development of new services that can leverage the unused 
capacity and create synergies with manufacturing activities (Fang et al., 2008). Scholars 
have noted that services and products can play a complementary role and influence each 
other. Fang et al. (2008) state that the main benefit of servitization is due to the synergy 
realized between products and services. In many cases, firms offer services, such as 
repair and maintenance, to support their product business. Kastalli & Van Looy (2013) 
show that offering services increases the demand for products. The role of industry-level 
factors have also been examined by scholars. Cusumano et al. (2015) offer a conceptual 
framework that links different life cycle stages of a manufacturing industry to the 
different levels and types of services offered by the firms.  
Given the significant attention to servitization in industry and academia, it is 
surprising how sparse our knowledge is regarding the circumstances that favor or 
discourage servitization. To the best of our knowledge, Cusumano et al. (2015) is the 
only study directed at explaining the factors that influence manufacturers’ decision to 
offer services (industry lifecycle stage in this case) and we are not aware of any empirical 
evidence regarding their propositions or other possible drivers. Furthermore, there exist 
theoretical tensions that demand an empirical resolution. For instance, as we discussed 
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earlier it has been argued that manufacturing firms resort to services when product 
revenues are declining. However servitization is a challenging strategic move (Baines, 
Lightfoot, Peppard, et al., 2009; Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, et al., 2009; Brax, 2005) 
and requires a significant upfront investment, which is less likely of a firm with declining 
revenues. A successful manufacturer with profitable business may have the necessary 
resources for developing new services. On the other hand, path-dependence due to the 
current success (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009) may limit the motivation for entering 
services as a radically new line of activity. It is not clear then whether servitization is 
motivated by financial success or loss. These effect may also realize at different levels of 
analysis.  
Diversification 
Diversification is one of the most investigated topics in strategic management. For 
the purpose of this study we define diversification as the degree to which a firm classified 
in one industry produces goods from other industries (Berry, 2015). The drivers of 
diversification have been extensively studied. As broad as it is, the literature on 
diversification also seems to lack sufficient attention to servitization.  
Drivers of diversification. Various proactive and defensive reasons have been 
suggested for diversification (Reed & Luffman, 1986). Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1988) 
notes that if transaction costs are higher in the market than in the organization 
diversification becomes an attractive strategy. Economies of scope and utilizing the 
unused capacity in immobile resources is one of the major rationales put forth by scholars 
to explain firms’ move towards diversification. Excess capacity in physical assets (e.g. 
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plant, equipment) is usually non-tradable in the market and is therefore a basis for 
diversification (Porter, 1985). Additionally, knowledge assets and production know-how 
can also be bases for diversification due to their minimal cost of transfer to other 
activities and difficulty to trade in the market (Porter, 1985, 1987). 
Public policy has also been a major factor in firm’s decision to diversify. Scholars 
have documented the role of anti-trust policies in incentivizing diversification (Auerbach 
& Reishus, 1988). Tax consideration have also been major factors in diversification 
decisions. If the taxation on dividends are high such that the shareholders prefer that their 
income be reinvested, company will be motivated to buy or develop other businesses in 
order to profitably use the free cash flow (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Turk & Baysinger, 
1989). Acquisitions typically lead to lowering of taxable income for corporations through 
increasing depreciable asset allowances (Auerbach & Reishus, 1988; Kaplan, 1989).  
Low performance, uncertainty of future cash flow, and desire for risk reduction 
have also discussed as motives for diversification internal to the firm. Rumelt (1974) 
argues that high performance erodes the motivation for diversification. Research suggests 
that low performance motivate firms to diversify, however, continued low performance 
post-diversification leads to divestiture (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson & 
Turk, 1990). 
Firms may also diversify in order to hedge against uncertainties in the market and 
the business environment (Rumelt, 1974). Uncertainty in expected future performance, or 
maturity of an industry motivate diversification as a defensive strategy (Leontiades, 
1982). Portfolio theory suggests that having multiple businesses reduces the risk as long 
the cash flows from those businesses are not perfectly correlated (Markham, 1973). 
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Diversification has also been suggested to help firm through decreasing the cost 
of capital since businesses can borrow from each other and decrease the threat of 
bankruptcy (Lewellen, 1971). This perspective assumes imperfect capital markets and 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, which means that internal 
funding will be more efficient than market funding (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1988). 
Furthermore, research has suggested managerial motives for diversification. 
Taking the perspective of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) scholars have argued 
that managers’ may pursue diversification for their own benefit. For example Amihud 
and Lev (1981) suggest that diversification may reduce the risk of job loss or income 
reduction for top management. Additionally, diversification increases firm size and 
consequently management compensation (Dyl, 1988). If managerial motives are 
involved, the threat, of course, is that diversification may be pursued even if it is 
detrimental to the firm. 
However, there does not exist a specific theory to explain why a firm would 
diversify into services not in other products. We argue that this gap is due to lack of 
attention to customer-side complementarity, as explained below. This paper aims to 
extend the diversification literature and provide a theory of the drivers of servitization. 
By introducing the concept of customer-side complementarity we will attempt to broaden 
the applicability of diversification theories to the servitization phenomenon. 
Customer-side Complementarity. The current theory of diversification does not 
completely address the interaction between the products and services in a servitized 
organization. What makes servitization different from the previously studied types of 
diversification is not only the fundamental differences in managing a service organization 
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and a product organization (Bowen & Ford, 2002), but also, that products and services 
have interrelationship and will end up with the same customer. In most cases, there is 
complementarity between the two, i.e. customer-side complementarity. Two goods, as we 
define, have customer-side complementarity when the value of one increases for the 
customer once they also obtain the other one. For example, an engine and a maintenance 
package have customer side-complementarity because it is more beneficial for the 
customer to have both goods rather than either one. Ceteris paribus, buying the 
maintenance package from the same company saves time and search costs for the 
customer and ensures a better service due to higher compatibility with the product 
(compared to purchasing from a third-party).  
Customer Value Chain. There is typically a process that a customer has to go 
through for buying an item, of which the purchase transaction is only one activity (Figure 
2.1). We refer to this process as customer value chain. The customer first needs to 
identify the item and supplier that meet his needs best. Once the product is selected and 
the suitable supplier is identified, the customer needs to secure funds for making the 
purchase. The actual transaction then takes place which involves the costs of visiting the 
supplier, negotiation, contracting, transfer of funds, and receiving the purchased item. 
The next phases are transportation of the items to the customer’s site (e.g. plant, office, 
home), installation, putting the product in use and maintaining it. Once the usage life of 
the product come to the end (i.e. when customer no longer needs the product), end-of-use 
activities, such as disposal or reselling, are carried out.  
Each of these steps may involve costs and risks for the customer, and 
correspondingly, opportunities for the supplier to create additional value. The selection 
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step may involve considerable costs (money, time, etc.) of search and information 
acquisition. As a result, customers may prefer long term relationships with fewer 
suppliers in order to economize on these costs (Bowen & Jones, 1986). There is a large 
risk element in this step due to the possibility of selecting the wrong item. Suppliers can 
offer consultation services in order to help customers select among a number of 
alternatives. Financing costs can also be a barrier for customers. It is fairly common for 
suppliers of expensive items to offer financing services, e.g. loan, to smooth the purchase 
process. The actual purchase transaction can also be made easier through the use of 
information technology, e.g. online ordering.  
There is also a sunk cost of initiating the connection with the supplier which can 
be a basis for servitization. That is when a customer has already invested in information 
acquisition, visiting the supplier, or deciding on purchase of a product (sunk costs), they 
can economize on these costs if they make other purchases (e.g. accompanying services) 
from the same supplier rather than other suppliers. Such customer-side complementarities 
can be bases for the supplier to develop more and more services around the core product. 
This is especially true for the cases where purchase of product automatically creates the 
need for purchasing a service. For example, the buyer of an automobile will typically 
need maintenance service, which will be less costly to buy from the same seller. There 
are also risks for customers due to supplier’s failure of fulfilling the promise. For 
example, the product may be defective or may not be delivered according to the 
agreements. These risks, then, creates the opportunity for sellers to offer return and 
warranty services.  
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For some products, e.g. production machinery, proper installation and use of the 
product needs extensive knowledge and training, and may not be hassle-free for the 
customer. As a result, some manufactures provide installation and training services to 
help customers gain the most value from their purchased product. Finally, the customers 
may face risks and costs due to not being able to resell or dispose of the product at the 
end of its useful life. As a result, manufacturers may offer buyback, disposal, or swapping 
services. Leasing services are also aimed at decreasing not only the initial investment but 
also the hassle (i.e. costs and risks) of reselling or disposing of the products that are not 
needed anymore.  
Based on the above framework, we will offer hypotheses in the next section to 
shed light on the drivers of servitization. In our theory development we will place a 
stronger emphasis on the effects that are specific to the relationship between products and 
services.  
 
Figure 2.1. The Customer Value Chain 
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HYPOTHESES 
Hi-Tech Industries 
In this section we examine the effect of hi-tech industries. Companies in hi-tech 
industry produce more complex products and need a higher level of service to support 
customers. As we discussed earlier, one of the reasons a customer may need services 
along with the product is to reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with the 
purchase process and post-purchase experience. Examples of the risks involved in the 
customer value chain in Figure 2.1 include buying the wrong product type – one that does 
not meet customer needs well, buying a defective product, product failure under use, not 
being able to find suitable parts or a repair service provider, system downtime and lost 
business during the repair time.  
These risks emanate from customers’ lack of expertise and knowledge about the 
product. If a customer is sufficiently knowledgeable about a product they can better 
assess the suitability and quality of the product before purchase and use the product post-
purchase. For instance, often times finding the right maintenance and repair service 
(M&R) provider is easier when the customer knows the product better. Knowing the 
technical characteristics of the product helps the owner to find a supplier with matching 
technical capabilities. Additionally, the relationship between M&R provider and the firm 
involves agency and knowledge asymmetry since the owner hires the M&R provider to 
perform a service on the product on his behalf (Bowen & Jones, 1986). Assessing the 
quality and performance of products is more difficult in hi-tech markets both pre- and 
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post-purchase. Higher decision making difficulty, consequently, increases customer’s 
need for services, e.g. recommendation service (Swaminathan 2003).  
Hi-tech sectors use the most advanced technology available and continuously 
create new knowledge through heavy investment in research and development (Chandler 
and Hikino 1990). Continuous creation and accumulation of product-related knowledge 
gives manufacturers an edge over external service providers. We conclude that in 
industries characterized by higher technology both customer’s need for receiving services 
and manufacturer’s advantage for offering them increase; therefore, we should observe a 
higher level of servitization in these industries.  
To the extent that product owner is knowledgeable about product, they can better 
observe the quality of the service delivered by the provider. In essence higher knowledge 
about the product decreases the knowledge asymmetry between the owner and service 
provider. As firms continue to operate in the market, their customers become more and 
more familiar with their products and the knowledge asymmetry between firms and 
customers shrinks. External service providers also become more mature and offer better 
service at lower cost. As a result, we expect servitization level to decrease with 
company’s age. 
Earlier in a firm’s life cycle, there are at least two sources of ambiguity for the 
customer. First, the reliability and quality of the product may be uncertain due to supply 
chain and operations uncertainty. The production and distribution processes are not 
optimized and as a result many defects and incompatibilities may exist. Additionally, the 
design of the product itself is not optimized and may undergo multiple changed before a 
robust model is introduced. Second, customers may not be familiar with the product. 
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There may be ambiguity in whether the new product actually matches their needs, how to 
install and use it. Simply put, the pros and cons of the product and its value relative to 
competitor products are not fully understood (Cusumano et al., 2015; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975). The mainframe computers introduced by IBM during the 1950s and 
1960s were expensive machines based on a new and largely unknown technology. 
Customers perceived a high level of risk and were reluctant to purchase the products. 
However, IBM developed various services such as maintenance or leasing packages to 
attract buyers to the new product. Xerox had to offer similar services at the time of 
introducing the plain-paper copier in the 1960s since the market was not familiar to the 
new technology and was reluctant to adopt it (Cusumano et al., 2015). Due to these 
ambiguities, purchase risk is significantly higher earlier in the products’ life cycle. 
Therefore, we expect manufacturing firms to offer a higher level of services in their 
earlier life cycle stages. 
Hypothesis 1. Manufacturers in hi-tech industries have a higher level of 
servitization. 
Hypothesis 2. Manufacturers with higher age have a lower level of servitization. 
  
   
71 
Industry Competitiveness and Market Share 
Competitive dynamics also have important implications for servitization. Scholars 
have emphasized that servitization can be a means to differentiate a firm’s offering from 
those of the competitors (Sawhney et al., 2003; Vargo & Lusch, 2004; Wise & 
Baumgartner, 1999). When competition increases in an industry due to entry of lower-
cost competitors, margins shrink and differences among products fade due to imitation. 
The incumbents, in turn, attempt to diversifying into services which have higher margins. 
The motive and capabilities for such a maneuver is stronger for industry leaders and firms 
with higher market share. Suarez et al. (2013) argue that decline of product margins 
encourages manufacturers to diversify into services. Kastalli and Van Looy (2013) also 
state that manufacturers develop services in order to escape the commoditization trap. 
The competitive pressures from low-cost competitors in the manufacturing sector has led 
to commoditization of many product categories. Consequently, some manufacturers, 
especially the ones with stronger technology and knowledge base, will shift focus to 
services as a new basis for differentiation. Value-added services transform commodities 
to differentiated goods (Bowen et al., 1989). Therefore, beyond the traditional product 
diversification attempts to grow their business, manufacturers also have incentive to 
develop services around their products to increase the margin that they receive from the 
current product classes. Portfolios of products and services are distinctive, complex, and 
harder to imitate (Baines & Lightfoot, 2013; Kastalli & Van Looy, 2013); therefore, they 
provide strong bases for competition against low cost competitors.  
This phenomenon is observed, for instance, when products from low-cost 
countries find their way to the market of a country with higher technology and product 
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quality. The incumbents will not be able to lower their cost, especially since they have 
exploited cost reduction opportunities in response to existing competition among 
themselves. However, they have a technology advantage over the new entrants and the 
more promising route to competition is through differentiation. As we discussed, 
servitization is a means to differentiation specially to save product margins. One of the 
factors that helped Caterpillar keep its competitive advantage over Komatsu was its 
strong global service network, something that Komatsu lacked. IBM’s redesigning of its 
strategy in 1990s also aligns with our argument. In the early 1990s IBM faced strong 
competition from Dell and Gateway who sold lower-priced computers directly to 
consumers. The consequence was a record loss of $5 billion. However, IBM started to 
rethink its business. By acquisition of Lotus the company began selling solutions instead 
of products. These solutions were combinations of products and services, designed to 
meet a broad array of customer needs. These examples, portray firms with stronger 
foothold in the market that were challenged by smaller entrants and ventured into 
services. The above arguments lead us to expect a higher level of servitization for firms 
that are in more competitive industries and firms that already possess a higher market 
share. 
Hypothesis 3. Level of servitization is positively associated with industry 
competitiveness.  
Hypothesis 4. Manufacturers with higher market share have a higher level of 
servitization. 
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Knowledge Stock 
Knowledge is a special resource. It is path-dependent and accumulates over time. 
It is also indivisible but can be applied to new activities with minimal cost. As a result, 
accumulated knowledge should provide strong motivation for diversification. Especially, 
successful development of services such as maintenance or product analytics requires 
leveraging proprietary knowledge about the products and generating economies of scope.  
Teece (1980) points out that a key factor in analyzing diversification based on 
economies of scope is the transaction cost. He argues that only the shared resources that 
are difficult to trade through market mechanisms provide the conditions for 
diversification. According to Teece (1980) transfer of proprietary knowledge through the 
market mechanism entails three difficulties: 1- recognition of trading partners: it is not 
readily clear who would be willing to purchase or buy firm’s knowledge, 2- disclosure: 
firms are not willing to share proprietary knowledge due to risks of opportunism by the 
trading party, and 3- even if the first two issues are solved, the buyer of proprietary 
knowledge faces challenges in forming the teams or sub-organizations that are capable of 
utilizing the acquired knowledge. Due to these features Teece argues that existence of 
proprietary knowledge provides sufficient condition for diversification. We expect that a 
manufacturer is more likely to develop services around its products if it possesses a large 
stock of proprietary knowledge. 
Hypothesis 5. A manufacturer’s stock of proprietary knowledge is positively 
associated with its level of servitization.  
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METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we use financial data and patent for US publicly-traded 
manufacturers. We will use the North America Annual Fundamentals database as well as 
the Business Segments database from Standard & Poor’s (2015) Compustat. The former 
contains fundamental data for U.S. and Canadian public firms, and, the latter provides 
historical data about business and geographic segments of over 24000 North American 
companies since 1976. Our analysis is limited to the manufacturing firms, i.e. the firms 
with the one-digit NAICS code 3. We use NAICS industry classification system because 
it contains a greater level of detail than the SIC system, especially for services. We will 
combine the North America database with the Business Segments database by the 
GVKEY (Global Company Key) code, which is the unique company identifier in 
Compustat. Finally, we will capture each firms patent data from patent data provided by 
National Bureau of Economic Research (2015). 
Following the literature, we will apply the following data filtering steps in order 
to construct the final sample. First, all of the observations with negative values on total 
revenues, assets, and R&D expenditure will be dropped. Second, firms with negative 
service revenues will be deleted. Third, observations with extreme values (i.e. the 1st and 
the 99th percentiles) on total revenues, assets, annual income, and research and 
development expenditure will be deleted in order to mitigate the effect of outliers or 
miss-recorded data. Finally, we will delete missing data list-wise. This leaves a sample of 
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2450 manufacturing firms and 16115 firm-year observations for the period of 1976 to 
2015.  
Dependent Variable - Servitization 
Service revenues (or its transformed versions) have been commonly used as a 
measure of servitization by the econometric analyses in the literature. A challenge in 
measuring servitization is that firms do not generally separate product and service 
revenues in their reports; consequently, services sales data are not easily available. Some 
scholars have partnered with companies in order to acquire service sales data. For 
instance, Kastalli and Van Looy (2013) collect longitudinal data from 44 subsidiaries of a 
multinational equipment manufacturer. They use subsidiaries’ service revenues 
(normalized to year 2000 using World Bank’s GDP deflator) as a measure of 
servitization. Another approach is to focus on specific industries where companies report 
their revenues broken down into products and services. Suarez et al. (2013) focus on pre-
packaged software products industry (SIC code 7372) in which around 400 firms were 
found to have stated service and product revenues separately in their 10-K reports. The 
authors normalize service revenues by the total revenues and study the effect of services 
on the operating margin. The above approaches, however, limit the analysis to a few 
firms or industries.  
Fang et al. (2008) develop a novel approach for estimating service revenues for a 
wide range of industries. Their method is based on identifying service segments within a 
company. By examining the description and the SIC codes of the operating segments 
reported in the Compustat Business Segment database, the authors divide a firm’s 
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segments into service and non-service. By adding up the revenues coming from service 
segments, the authors compute the total service revenues for 477 publicly traded 
manufacturers. To our knowledge, Fang et al.’s (2008) procedure is the only method 
offered in the literature that is applicable to a wide variety of firms and industries. Our 
approach for measuring service revenue (Service) is inspired by Fang et al. (2008). 
Independent Variables 
We will determine hi-tech industries (Hi-Tech) based on the list provided by Hall 
and Vopel (1996). Firm age (Age) will be measured from the year of initial public 
offering to date. We measure market share by dividing firm sales by total sales of the 
industry in a specific year. Industry is defined as all firms with the same 4 digit NAICS 
codes. Industry competitiveness will be measured using Herfindahl index (Kwoka, 1985). 
Herfindahl index is the sum of squared market shares of all firms in an industry. 
Herfindahl index varies between zero and one, and a higher number indicates higher 
concentration of market share and lack of competition. In order to measure knowledge 
stock, we use patent information. We used the cumulative number of patents from 1976 
to date as a measure of firm’s accumulated knowledge. Following the literature (e.g. Liu 
and Wong, 2011) we assume an annual depreciation rate of 20 percent for the value of 
older patents.  
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Control Variables 
R&D intensity captures firm-level differences in innovation effort and can be 
linked to the amount of new services developed by the firm. Therefore, we will control 
for it in the analysis.  Firm size is another important factor to consider. Larger firms have 
more resources to develop new services. In order to control for firm size, we include total 
sales (Sales) in our analysis. We control for firm’s return on assets and net margin as 
measures of profitability. More profitable firms may be more willing to develop new 
services. They may also be more successful in marketing new services. We also control 
for slack resources. Following Fang et al. (2008) and Lee and Grewal (2004), we 
operationalize slack as the common principal component between from two financial 
ratios (1) retained earnings to total assets and (2) working capital to total assets. Retained 
earnings is the portion of net earnings that a company chooses not to pay out as 
dividends, but to retain for unforeseen eventualities and implementation of corporate 
strategies (Bourgeois, 1981). Working capital is the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities. Current assets are the liquid assets (cash, inventories, receivables, etc.) 
and current liabilities are the payments due in one year. We also control for human 
resource productivity as an indicator of human resource qualifications. Firms with higher 
qualified workers are at an advantage for offering services. Consistent with prior research 
(Datta et al., 2005; Guthrie, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Koch & McGrath, 1996) we 
operationalize human resource productivity with sales per employee – the ratio of firm 
sales to number of employees. Furthermore, we control for B2B vs B2C industries (B2B) 
as the need for service offering may be different in these two environments. We also 
control for industry growth (Ind_Growth) as firms in high-growth industry may have 
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higher incentive to further focus on manufacturing compared to services. Finally, we 
account for competitive pressures and imitation effects by controlling for service ratio of 
the leader in the focal industry as well as total service ratio of rivals to a focal firm. In 
each case, the focal firm is excluded and the total services sales (of the firm with the 
largest market share or of all firms in the industry) is divided by the total sales. 
Additionally, we included year dummy variables to control for year to year variations in 
the industry. 
 
Analysis Results 
We analyze the data using multilevel regression model (Snijders & Bosker, 2011), 
particularly because our data has a multilevel structure. Firms will constitute the first 
level and industries the second level. Time, firm and industry were considered as levels 
of analysis. Since the distribution of sales and service sales are highly skewed we used 
their logged version in our analysis. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below, show descriptive statistics 
and correlation among the variables, correspondingly. Table 2.3 presents results of the 
multi-level regression analysis.  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(Service) 101137 1.038 1.902 0 8.5 
Hi-Tech 101137 0.343 0.475 0 1 
Age 97805 9.058 7.085 1 31 
Herfindahl  Index 101137 0.279 0.19 0 1 
Market Share 100596 0.072 0.154 0 1 
Knowledge  
 Stock 
27703 205.285 815.422 1 28588 
ln(Sale) 100597 4.31 2.277 0 10.46 
Return on Assets 100567 -0.092 0.476 -6.91 0.33 
Net Margin 90429 -0.008 0.169 -1 0.37 
Leader Service Ratio 100663 0.098 0.177 -0.02 1.35 
Rivals Service Ratio  97355 0.144 0.098 0 1.24 
Industry Growth 101136 1.007 0.013 0.92 1.14 
B2B 84766 0.574 0.495 0 1 
Sales Per 
 Employee 
93654 161.33 557.474 0 91135 
Slack 96313 0.031 0.015 -1.07 0.1 
R&D Intensity 67490 0.336 1.587 0 48.2 
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Table 2.2. Correlation Table  
ln(Service) Hi-Tech Age Herfindahl 
Index 
Market 
Share 
Knowledge 
Stock 
ln(Sale) 
Hi-Tech 0.01 
      
Age 0.10 -0.02 
     
Herfindahl 
Index 
0.00 -0.09 0.07 
    
Market  
  Share 
0.17 -0.19 0.17 0.35 
   
Knowledge 
Stock 
0.12 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.26 
  
ln(Sale) 0.33 -0.21 0.33 0.00 0.46 0.34 
 
Return on 
  Assets 
0.11 -0.12 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.41 
Net Margin 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.34 
Leader Service  
  Ratio 
0.07 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
Rivals Service  
  Ratio 
0.14 0.31 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.17 
Industry Growth 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.04 
B2B -0.06 -0.22 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.13 
Sales Per 
Employee 
0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.13 
Slack 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.18 
R&D Intensity -0.06 0.13 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.28 
 
Table 2.2. Correlation Table (continued)  
Return 
on 
Assets 
Net 
Margi
n 
Service 
Ratio 
of Leader 
Service 
Ratio 
of Rivals 
Industr
y 
Growth 
B2B Sales Per 
Employe
e 
Slac
k 
Net Margin 0.79 
       
Leader 
  Service  
  Ratio 
-0.04 -0.03 
      
Rivals 
Service  
  Ratio 
-0.12 -0.11 0.35 
     
Industry 
  Growth 
-0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 
    
B2B 0.08 0.05 -0.13 -0.36 0.00 
   
Sales Per 
Employee 
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
  
Slack 0.35 0.32 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
R&D 
Intensity 
-0.31 -0.46 0.06 0.21 0.01 -
0.13 
-0.10 -0.35 
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Table 2.3. Multi-level Regression Results  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(Service t-1) ln(Service t-2) ln(Service t-3) 
Hi-Tech 0.565*** 0.525*** 0.510*** 
Age -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.016** 
Herfindahl Index -0.111 -0.193 -0.232+ 
Market Share 0.542** 0.467** 0.433* 
Knowledge Stock 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
ln(Sale) 0.313*** 0.294*** 0.280*** 
Return on Assets -0.038 0.181 0.193 
Net Margin -0.037 -0.124 -0.080 
Leader Service 
Ratio 0.200* 0.168+ 0.227* 
Rivals Service 
Ratio 0.547* 0.458* 0.307 
Industry Growth -1.997+ -1.652 -0.818 
B2B -0.315** -0.358** -0.356** 
Sales Per Employee -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Slack -13.648 -7.126 -7.342 
R&D Intensity 0.043 -0.010 0.132 
Constant 1.821 1.598 0.874 
Year Dummies Y Y Y 
    
ln(sd(Industry 
Effect) -0.810*** -0.729*** -0.665*** 
ln(sd(Firm Effect) 0.446*** 0.465*** 0.484*** 
ln(sd(Residual) 0.248*** 0.258*** 0.269***     
LL -2.94e+04 -2.78e+04 -2.64e+04 
AIC 58852.228 55693.940 52827.388 
BIC 59228.915 56067.605 53198.118 
N 16115 15151 14270 
+ p<0.10 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
*** p<0.001 
 
 
 
As a robustness check we use three lag values between dependent and 
independent variables. Models 1 to 3 use lag values of 1 to 3 years, correspondingly. The 
results indicate that firms in hi-tech industries have a higher level of servitization. 
Additionally, servitization is negatively associated with firm age. Therefore, we conclude 
that H1 and H2 are supported. Contrary to our expectation industry competition was not 
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significantly related to servitization. However, market share had a significant and positive 
influence on servitization. Therefore, H3 is not supported, while, H4 is supported. 
Finally, the coefficient of knowledge stock is positive and significant in all three models 
indicating support for H5.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Servitization is a major shift in the manufacturing sector. Many manufacturers 
have decided to add services to their offerings in an effort to differentiation themselves 
from the competition and secure higher margins. This work analyzes the factors that 
motivate manufacturers to offer services. We combined financial statement data and 
patent data in order to empirically analyze these motivating factors. We obtained a 
sample of 2450 firms and 16115 firm-year observations and analyzed it using multi-level 
regression. The results indicate that firms in hi-tech sector have a higher degree of 
servitization. This is in line with our argument that because hi-tech products are more 
complex and technology intensive, customers’ need a higher level of services from the 
firm. All aspects of the economic transaction from search, selection, purchase, 
installation, use and maintenance are more complex in the case of hi-tech products and 
therefore there is demand for manufacturers support of the product in the form of add-on 
services. We also find that manufacturing firm offer less and less service as they age. We 
argue that this is due to increased familiarity of customers with products, higher diffusion 
of product-related information, shift towards commoditization and maturity of service 
suppliers.  
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Surprisingly, we found that industry competitiveness was not significantly related 
to servitization. This result could be due to mixed indications of competitiveness for high 
and low ends of the market. Higher competition may drive high-end manufacturers to 
differentiate themselves through services, while, it may drive lower-end manufacturers to 
further focus on process improvement and cost reduction in their product business. This 
possibility is further strengthened by our finding that market share is positively associated 
with level of servitization. On average, firms with higher market share tend to offer a 
higher level of service due to their superior resources and technology. Manufacturers 
with larger market share also find a larger business opportunity for developing services, 
and therefore, they can better justify the costs of servitization. Finally, we show that firms 
with larger knowledge stock tend to offer more services. This is in line with our argument 
that diversifying into services requires a high level of knowledge and technology that can 
be widely different from knowledge required for manufacturing. Once a firm has invested 
in innovation and accumulated knowledge, its ability to venture into new areas of 
business increases and the marginal cost of applying knowledge is small. Therefore, a 
firm with a large stock of knowledge has higher ability and economic motive to diversify 
into services. Our findings are robust under different lag structures and shed light on the 
enabler and drivers of servitization across all manufacturing industries. Using the new 
framework of customer value chain, we were able to point to some aspects of 
servitization that are ignored in diversification theories. Some of the concepts proposed in 
this study such as knowledge asymmetry between firm and customer in hi-tech sector, 
firm age and maturity of service suppliers are particularly important in analysis of 
servitization and have not been explored sufficiently in the diversification literature. Our 
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study advances this literature by showing that servitization has different characteristics 
compared to the traditional forms of diversification and offers new explanations as to 
why manufacturers become servitized.  
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ESSAY III 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEALER NETWORKS TO THE  
SUCCESS OF AUTOMAKERS 
ABSTRACT 
Democratization of information has eroded much of the informational advantage 
of automobile dealerships over their customers. Savvy consumers research extensively 
online before even visiting a dealer and do not depend on salesmen to guide them for 
their purchase. This trend has commoditized several aspects of dealership activities and 
called into question the importance of their role played in the automobile supply chain. 
This paper investigates how important dealer services are for the market success of a car 
brand. By scraping web we obtain sales and consumer rating information for all 
dealerships in the US and all new cars offered for sale in five car classes. Our findings 
demonstrate that the aggregate quality ratings of dealerships influences consumers’ 
choice between brands, which confirms the importance of services that go along with the 
product in the automobile market. Results further demonstrate that this effect is stronger 
in markets where the brand’s dealer network is sparse (increasing internal switching 
cost), and the competing dealer networks are dense (decreasing external switching cost). 
Keywords:  
Automobile industry, dealerships, automakers, service quality 
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THE ROLE OF DEALERSHIP NETWORK IN THE SUCCESS OF 
AUTOMAKERS 
INTRODUCTION 
Distribution and services play a major role in many capital goods industries. 
Capital goods are bought to deliver value throughout their lifetime, and manufacturers 
that can help their customers get the most out of their products will be able sustain their 
competitiveness. Capital goods manufacturers typically distribute their product through 
dealership network. Dealers not only sell the products but also offer a wide array of other 
services during and after sales. The quality of service provided these dealers can make 
the difference between success and failure of the manufacturer. 
“The biggest reason for Caterpillar's success has been our system of distribution 
and product support. Don't get me wrong. We think we are better engineers and 
manufacturers than our competitors. But we are convinced that our single greatest 
advantage over our competition was and still is our system of distribution and 
product support” – Chief Executive Officer of Caterpillar (Fites, 1996: 85) 
 
Caterpillar is a prominent example of how dealership networks can save a 
manufacturer in times of fierce competition. In the 1980’s, when Japanese manufacturers 
were overcoming their American counterparts and capturing US market, Caterpillar did 
not fall to Komatsu despite Komatsu’s significant cost advantage and remarkable product 
quality. Many observers attribute this success primarily to Caterpillars strong dealership 
network that offered unparalleled service quality to customers over the product lifetime 
(Fites, 1996; Hitt, Tyler, Hardee, & Park, 1995; International Council on Sustainable 
Development, 2017).  
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Similarly, dealerships in the automotive industry play a key role. Almost all new 
car sales in the US are made by dealers. Auto dealers provide a number of critical 
services to consumers. Besides executing sales, they build long-term relationship with 
their local community, provide information and financing services to customers, trade in 
their old cars, provide spare parts, and handle maintenance, repair and recalls. In other 
words, almost all of the services that need to accompany automobiles are offered by the 
dealerships.  
That being said, there has been significant controversy about the actual value that 
automobile dealers provide in the supply chain. The dealership business model has stood 
the test of time and many attempts at disintermediating dealers and direct selling have 
failed. Some argue that underneath this resilience is the significant and unique value that 
dealers offer to customers and manufacturers which cannot be bypassed (Keller & Elias, 
2014).  
Yet others argue that technology is eroding the role of dealers, and dealership 
business model is doomed to fail (Economist, 2015). Savvy consumers increasing obtain 
car information and obtain loans and insurance online and only visit dealerships for the 
purchase transaction. Additionally, manufacturers continue to experiment with alternative 
distribution models such as direct selling and showrooming. This perspective implies that 
dealers no longer provide significant value in the supply network to justify a separate 
middleman entity connecting manufacturers with customers. 
Evaluating these opposing views on the value of dealerships is an empirical task, 
and should be based on objective analysis of real data. Existing studies of automobile 
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industry offer little evidence on this issue. Therefore, we propose an empirical study to 
disentangle the economic value of dealers for automakers.  
Our research questions is how important the service performance of the dealership 
network is for the success of automakers. In other words, how much of the variation in 
sales of a car in a market is explained by the quality of services offered by the 
dealerships, as reflected in consumer ratings and reviews. All of the activities done by 
dealerships are considered as services in our study. These include sales, financing, repair 
and maintenance, spare parts provision, managing recalls, and trade-ins. 
We leverage sales and performance data of various car models in the US market 
as well as quality ratings, characteristics and practices of dealerships. We model 
automobile sales at the dealership- and the manufacturer-level in each market and use 
multi-level regression analysis to quantify the effect of dealership consumer ratings and 
characteristics of dealer network on car sales. This analysis will allow us to understand 
the factors that matter most for the success of the individual dealership and for the overall 
market share of the manufacturer.  
If consumers’ decision to buy from a brand is influenced by their satisfaction with 
its dealerships, then the variation in market share of that brand should be, in part, 
explained by variation of consumer ratings of dealerships across different markets. This 
would mean that reduction of performance of dealerships of a brand would encourage 
customers to switch to another brand and that loyalty to product brand does not prevent 
the damage due to bad service (between-brand switching behavior). Conversely, if brand 
loyalty trumps satisfaction with dealership service, we should see customers switching to 
better dealerships of the same brand (within-brand switching behavior). It is our goal to 
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quantify the extent of between-brand switching behavior and understand how 
manufacturers can minimize it.  
Besides the main effect of dealership performance on sales, we also explore the 
moderating role of dealership network structure. In particular, we explore the role of 
internal and external network densities. Dealer network density is defined as the number 
of dealerships. For a car brand and in a specific market, internal density of the dealership 
network is defined as the density of its own dealerships network while external density is 
defined as the aggregate density of other brands’ dealership networks. Density measures 
are critical because they determine the ease of switching within and between brands. If 
the internal density is high for a brand, consumers may have an easier job switching 
internally and staying with that brand. Similarly, if the external network density if high 
there will be plenty of opportunities for consumers to switch to a different brand. 
Therefore, the two network density metrics are important factors in evaluating the impact 
of dealership performance on market success of the automaker.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In analyzing the contribution of dealerships to brands, the studies on brand loyalty 
offer useful insights. Several issues of customer equity and the (service) quality have 
investigated the antecedents of brand loyalty and market success of brands (Bolton, 1998; 
Bolton, Kannan, & Bramlett, 2000; Bolton & Lemon, 1999; Mittal & Kamakura, 2001; 
Zeithaml, 1988; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996) 
However, this body of work is largely focused on the dyadic relationships with 
consumers. The interplay between manufacturer success and dealer performance remains 
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an understudied area. And, studies that do consider this interplay tend to focus on loyalty 
and re-purchase behavior issues as only one of several factors that contribute to market 
success of manufacturers. For instance, in lower-end segments of the market, consumers 
are driven by utilitarian aspects of the product, e.g., features and packages. As these 
characteristics are becoming increasingly similar, brand loyalty may be weak and not a 
major determinant of success.  
Bloemer and Lemmink (1992) conduct a mail survey of car buyers investigate the 
association between customer satisfaction, dealer loyalty and brand loyalty. The authors 
find that brand loyalty is impacted by customer satisfaction with the car as well as loyalty 
to dealer. They also demonstrate that satisfaction with the sales service and with the after‐
sales service both drive loyalty to dealer. It is important to note that a survey of car 
buyers after a successful purchase from a dealer is likely to find that customer are 
receptive to conducting their future business with that dealer. However, consumers’ 
actual behavior in future may be different as several other factors will play a role when it 
is time for a new purchase.  
Mittal, Kumar, and Tsiros (1999) sheds light on this issue. They conduct a 
longitudinal survey of car purchasers and focus on temporal aspect of the relationship 
between satisfaction and purchase intentions. The authors find that satisfaction with 
dealers and cars influences short term repurchase intention. But a second survey 
administered 21 months later, showed that there is no relationship between initial 
satisfaction and longer-term purchase intention.  
Punj and Brookes (2002) present a different perspective. They focus on the actual 
re-purchase behavior, rather than stated intentions. In a survey of new automobile buyers, 
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they find that about 67% percent of new car buyers had a clear pre-purchase intention 
about the make or model they want to purchase before visiting a dealer. Contrary to the 
findings of Bloemer and Lemmink (1992), the study shows that only a very small portion 
of customers considered the dealer important in their purchase decision.  
These mixed findings might partly be due different measurement methods, e.g., 
loyalty intention (Mittal et al., 1999) versus actual switching behavior (Punj & Brookes, 
2002) to investigate the dealer’s contribution to brand loyalty. Studies that use intention 
instead of actual behavior can over-estimate results by ignoring all intervening factors at 
the time of purchase decision.  
Verhoef et al. (2007) attempt to reconcile prior findings by arguing that 
contribution of dealers to brand loyalty depends on the type of brand. They propose that 
high prestige cars are bought for status and superior product characteristics. Also, 
economy models are bought for their price. In both cases customer has strong pre-
purchase constraints and dealers cannot make a significant difference. While, for volume 
models dealers can make a significant difference in customer decision making and 
ultimately loyalty to the brand.  
Repeat purchase may also be a function of customer characteristics. Lambert-
Pandraud et al. (2005) demonstrate that older customers tend to search fewer brands and 
dealerships, and are more likely to repurchase the same car. Consumer characteristics and 
demographics offer important avenues for exploring contingencies. 
It is important to note that consumer’s loyalty towards a single dealer could have 
different effects on purchase intention than consumer’s perception of the dealer network 
as a whole. A customers’ affinity with a single dealer may not play a role in repurchase 
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intention since it may fade over time and alternative dealers are available. However, a 
customer’s perception of the overall level of service offered by the dealership network 
can be more salient in consumer’s mind. Our study is different from prior literature in 
that it measure quality of service at the level of dealer network, rather than a single 
dealer.  
In addition, the studies on contribution of dealers to brand manufacturers has been 
concentrated on loyalty and re-purchase decision issues. Many studies have used survey 
and interview methods which can suffer from memory recall limitations and the gap 
between original intentions and future behavior.  
As indicated by Mittal et al. (1999), the salience of determinants of customer 
intentions shift over time. When asking recent new car buyers about their purchase, 
customers may place emphasis on dealer’s role in their decision. However, after the 
purchase customers spend a lot more time with the product than the dealer and salience of 
dealer’s actions may diminish for customers. By the time the customer wants to purchase 
a new product the original impact of the dealer may have been forgotten. This finding 
shows that customers’ expressed loyalty is not the best measure for investigating dealers’ 
impact. To overcome this issue, we use market share as the outcome variable, which 
reflects customers’ actual purchase behavior in an objective manner. 
Furthermore, dealers’ performance does not impact existing customers only. It 
impacts first time buyers as well, directly, via interaction at the time of shopping and, 
indirectly, via word of mouth. Purchasers from a brand constitute a mixture of repeat and 
first-time buyers with unknown proportions. Our measure of market share captures the 
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combined purchases of these customers with their current composition, which is the 
ultimate figure impacting manufacturers’ bottom line. 
Several factors also have changed since the above-mentioned studies were 
conducted. The automobile distribution channels are changing rapidly by proliferation of 
information via online and offline sources that diminish the role traditionally played by 
dealerships. Automobiles are increasingly similar as manufacturers quickly imitate each 
other and replicate the features of competing cars. In many cases, a new technology 
appears in competing brand in the same year. For instance most mid-size automobiles in 
the US market added adaptive cruise control capabilities to their models in 2018. These 
harmonic maneuvers suggests that manufacturers access similar information and 
technologies long before any competing model hits the market. Growing similarly of cars 
can have important implications for the role played by dealerships that need to be 
investigated.   
Our study also uses a much larger dataset compared to previous studies. Our 
dataset incudes demographic and economic characteristics of regions as well as 
availability of competing alternative within customers’ reach that have been ignored in 
previous studies. Note that a customer may re-purchase a brand merely due to lack of 
other options, e.g., long distance to dealerships of other brands. Finally, we consider the 
dealership network of a manufacture as a whole rather than individual dealerships. This 
may also increase the accuracy of our results as customers can switch between 
dealerships.  
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HYPOTHESES 
Consumers’ satisfaction with a brand’s dealerships may have mixed implication 
for their attitude towards the brand. With the exception of Tesla, almost all new car sales 
in the US are made by dealerships. Consumers’ purchase from a dealer may be reflective 
of their satisfaction with the sales practices of that dealer. At the individual level, a 
consumer would view the product and the service as an integrated bundle. Automobiles 
need a significant amount of service both at the time of purchase (e.g., consultation, 
trade-in, and financing) and after purchase (e.g., maintenance and repair). Mittal et al. 
(1999) demonstrate that loyalty to dealers and brands have cross over effects and impact 
each other. For most consumers, dealerships are either the sole or the most convenient 
way to access automobile services. Therefore, they are likely to view dealerships’ 
services and automaker’s products as parts of the same package, and their perception of 
these parts would be tied together. If the only way to purchase and maintain a high-
quality car brand is through a poor performing dealer network, consumers’ satisfaction 
with the product is likely to suffer. Similarly in heavy machinery industry, scholars have 
argued that dealer services are significant considerations in customers’ purchase 
decisions (International Council on Sustainable Development, 2017). Therefore, a higher 
product price can be well worth the outstanding service from dealerships. 
In addition, the Appraisal-Tendency Framework suggests, emotions carry over 
from past situations to color future judgments and choices (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Therefore, consumer’s experience 
with the service offered by dealerships is likely to also impact their view of the 
automobile, the brand, and ultimately future purchase intentions. 
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On the flip side, recent evolutions in the economy and consumer habits may have 
diminished the role played by dealerships. Expansion of internet and democratization of 
information have eroded much of the informational advantage previously enjoyed by auto 
dealers. Consumers increasingly use internet to learn about automobiles and make their 
selection. Autotrader (2016) reports that automobile buyers spend 59% of their time 
researching online. This trend has downplayed the dealer’s role in providing consultation 
and pricing, making the sales process a commodity.  
In addition, many consumers do not find their experience with dealerships 
particularly enjoyable. In the 2016 Consumer Automotive Index survey (Beepi Inc., 
2016) 52% of car shoppers reported they feel anxious or uncomfortable at dealerships, 
62% reported feeling pressured to buy, and 54% said they would “love” to be able to 
purchase a car online. These findings are by no means good news for auto dealers. If 
anything, they show that car buyers are inclined to embrace other forms purchasing cars. 
However, dealerships remain the dominant channel for distribution of automobiles. In 
addition, the high startup cost of opening a dealership keep entry barriers high and limits 
competition. As a result, consumers do not have many choices when it comes to 
purchasing a car, and satisfaction with dealership services, or lack thereof, may not play a 
large role in their purchase decisions. The improvement in quality of cars over time has 
decreased the risk to the buyers and therefore the transaction costs. It has also reduced the 
need for servicing the automobile. This means consumers need less help and support 
from dealers (Autopolis, 2000).  
Ratchford et al. (2003) also note that car buyers meet dealers only intermittently 
while they use the car on an ongoing basis. In this process, dealers can have an impact 
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when customer visits them, however, this impact will fade away gradually. By the time 
the customer is ready to make a new purchase previous dealer experience may not be 
relevant any more.  
In addition, the growing similarity of models in their features and technology 
makes the purchase decision a matter of taste rather than a rational comparison of utility, 
leading to two opposite effects. First, it makes the purchase easier in terms of comparison 
and information acquisition. Second, it may make psychological and soft factors such as 
the experience at the dealership more of a determinant in customer’s decision.  
Taken together these arguments suggest that consumers’ response to the quality of 
service received at dealerships is mixed. It remains an empirical question whether and 
how much purchase decisions and ultimately automakers’ market performance is 
impacted by dealership performance. 
H1a(b). Quality of services offered by dealerships of a car brand in a market 
positively impacts (does not impact) market share of that brand. 
The arguments above suggest that limited options, commoditization and access to 
information may have dampened consumers’ response to dealership quality. In what 
follows, we explore each of these factors as a boundary condition. 
Competition and Option Availability. As a brand gains more presence in a 
market and the rival brands lose presence the benefits of higher quality dwindle since the 
focal brand already captures a high level of market share and moves towards 
monopolizing the market. Therefore, there are decreasing returns to service quality. 
Consumer’s react to low quality by moving their business between dealerships or brands. 
The extent to which customers can exercise this option depends on availability of other 
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dealerships within reach. In response to undesirable quality of a dealership, consumers 
would be motivated to take their business to another dealership of that brand. And if 
those dealerships are densely located in the market, consumer would have an easy job 
switching. Cachon et al. (2005) demonstrate that this search is beneficial for consumers 
due to the overlapping assortment at various dealers particularly when there are limited 
options available within each product class. From the manufacturer’s perspective this is a 
desirable outcome since lower performance of one dealer is compensated by better 
performance of another keeping consumers within the brand’s network. By the same 
logic, if dealerships of competing brands are abundant in vicinity of a poor performing 
dealership, consumers would have an easier job switching to another brand. However, 
higher service quality keeps customers loyal to the brand and therefore the external 
switching behavior will be forestalled. Internal switching will also no longer be as 
beneficial since the service quality is generally high and there is not much room for 
finding an even better option. Therefore, we expect service quality to moderate the effect 
of density of dealership network for the focal brand (internal network density) and the 
rival brands (external network density). Figure 3.1 below summarizes our theoretical 
model. 
H2. Dealer network service quality negatively moderates the effect of internal 
network density on market share. 
H3. Dealer network service quality positively moderates the effect of external 
network density on market share. 
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical Model 
  
Competitor Presence
Mfg. Market Success
Brand Presence
-
Competition
External 
Network Density
Internal Network 
Density
+
Dealer Network Service 
Quality (DSQ)
Consumer 
Rating
H2 H3 H1
Market Share
   
99 
METHODS AND FINDINGS 
Data Collection 
We scraped a consumer-facing website to access new car inventory of all 
dealerships in the United States during an 11-day period (Jan 18th-30th, 2018 – except 20th 
and 21st due to technical issue leading to incomplete download of data). To cover a wide 
range of cars, we included five classes of automobiles – Subcompact Sedan, Compact 
Sedan, Mid-Size Sedan, Mid-Size SUV, and Full-Size Luxury. Within each class we 
included all major makes-models according to their US market share as reported in Table 
3.1 (refer to “US Car Sales,” 2018 for market share analysis of various make-models 
within each class). There are 25 makes (in this paper also referred to as brands) in our 
sample for which Figure 3.1 reports the average daily sales. 
We observed about 800,000 unique cars in the inventory in any given day. By 
comparing the VINs across consecutive days we were able to identify cars that are sold in 
each day by each dealership. The scraping procedure provided make, model and price of 
each car as well as consumer rating and review count for dealerships. 
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Table 3.1. List of Makes-Models by Class 
SubCompact Compact Mid-Size Mid-Size SUV Full-Size Luxury 
Chevrolet 
Sonic 
Ford Fiesta 
Honda Fit 
Hyunda 
Accent 
Kia Rio 
Kia Soul 
Nissan Versa 
Toyota iA 
Toyota Pius 
C 
Toyota Yaris 
Chevrolet Bolt 
EV 
Chevrolet Cruze 
Chevrolet Volt 
Ford C-Max 
Ford Focus 
Honda Civic 
Hyundai Elantra 
Hyundai Ioniq 
Kia Forte 
Mazda Mazda3 
Mitsubishi 
Lancer 
Nissan Leaf 
Nissan Sentra 
Subaru Impreza 
Toyota Corolla 
Toyota Prius 
Toyota Prius 
Prime 
Toyota Prius V 
Volkswagen 
Golf 
Volkswagen 
Jetta 
Chevrolet 
Malibu 
Chrysler 200 
Ford Fusion 
Honda Accord 
Hyundai Sonata 
Kia Optima 
Mazda Mazda6 
Nissan Altima 
Subaru Legacy 
Subaru Outback 
Toyota Camry 
Volkswagen 
Passat 
Buick Enclave 
Buick Envision 
Chevrolet Captiva 
Sport 
Chevrolet Traverse 
Dodge Durango 
Ford Edge 
Ford Explorer 
Ford Flex 
GMC Acadia 
Honda Pilot 
Hyundai Santa Fe 
Jeep Grand 
Cherokee 
Kia Sorento 
Mazda CX-9 
Nissan Murano 
Nissan Pathfinder 
Toyota 4Runner 
Toyota Highlander 
VW Atlas 
VW Touareg 
Audi A8/S8 
Bentley Flying 
Spur 
Bentley Mulsanne 
BMW 7-series 
Cadillac CT6 
Genesis G90 
Hyundai Equus 
Jaguar XJ 
Kia K900 
Lexus LS 
Maserati 
Quattroporte 
Mercedes-Benz S-
class 
Porsche Panamera 
 
 
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
      
 
 
Figure 3.1. Average Daily US Sales of the Makes Included in the Sample 
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Next we used census data for identifying markets, their geographic boundaries, 
and demographic characteristics. We used an established classification of cities into core-
based statistical areas (CBSAs) which identifies a metropolitan or micropolitan core as 
well as all surrounding cities that are integrated with it – based on commuting patterns of 
the residents. We considered each CBSA as a separate market. This classification is well 
suited for our study as we would like to consider all adjacent cities whose residents have 
significant commuting among them as one market. Using census concordance tables we 
assigned every dealerships to one of 791 CBSAs in the US by their zip code. Our final 
sample had 36394 observations including 10619 unique CBSA-make-class combinations.  
In order to measure rating of a brand’s dealer network in the market, we took the 
weighted average  of consumer ratings across all dealerships in a market, with weights 
being the dealers’ review count. Brand’s success in the market was measured as its 
market share. Internal (external) network densities were also measured via the number of 
dealerships of the same (competing) brands in the same market per square mile of land 
within the CBSA(i.e., market). Finally, we control for the effect of weighted average 
rating of competitors in the same class, education (percent high school graduated or 
higher), median income, median age, population, average commute time to work, average 
vehicles owned and percent households with access to a broadband internet. We use the 
following random effects econometric model to test our hypotheses. Descriptive statistics 
of the variables in the analysis are presented in Table 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
    Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Market 
Share 
37.3 34 0.2 100             
(2) Rating 4.6 0.5 1 5 -0.03            
(3) IND 15.2 14 0.8 138.3 -0.1 0.03           
(4) END 127.1 118.1 0 757 -0.34 0.06 0.65          
(5) Land 
Area 
3.6 3.7 0.1 27.3 -0.27 -0.01 -0.22 -0.06         
(6) Education 87.9 4.3 63.3 96.8 -0.08 0.09 0.1 0.13 -0.14        
(7) Family 
Income 
69.2 13.1 35.9 112.5 -0.3 0.07 0.28 0.51 0.1 0.44       
(8) Age 38.1 4 24.7 67.3 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.15 -0.25 0.16 -0.08      
(9) Pop. 2 3.1 0.1 20.2 -0.34 0.03 0.29 0.6 0.43 -0.15 0.33 -0.09     
(10) Commute 
Time 
14.1 3.1 5.2 30.4 -0.14 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.25 -0.19 0 0.05 0.27    
(11) Vehicles 
Owned 
1.2 0.7 0 7.8 0.03 0 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.1 0.12 -0 0.45   
(12) Internet 
Pen. 
81.7 5.1 49.4 90.8 -0.3 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.22 0.43 0.69 -0.12 0.27 0.04 -0.1  
(13) Comp. 
Rating 
4.5 0.4 0.5 5 -0.08 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.11 
 
 
 
The Econometric Model 
We introduce the following notation, in formulating our econometric model.   
Indexes 
• m: car make, e.g., Toyota 
• c: car class, e.g., Mid-Size Sedan 
• k: market, e.g., Phoenix metropolitan area 
• d: dealership 
• t: time 
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Variables 
• MaketSharemckt: Market share of make m, in class c, in market k, at time t. 
• Ratingmk: Aggregate (i.e., wgt. average) rating of dealers of make m, in market k 
at time t. 
• INDmk: Internal dealer network density of make m, in market k. 
• ENDmk: External dealer network density of make m, in market k. 
• C: Vector of control variables 
• Dm, Ds, Dc, Dt : Dummy variables for make, state, class and time 
• . : individual regression coefficients (with number index) or vectors thereof (with 
letter index). 
• umck: random effect for each market-class-make unit 
• mckt: random error term 
The model used for analysis of the data is presented below. 
MaketSharemckt = 0 + 1*Ratingmk + 2*INDmk + 3*Ratingmk*INDmk + 
4*ENDmk+ 5* Ratingmk*ENDmk + c*C + m*Dm +s*Ds +c*Dc +t*Dt + 
umck+ mckt 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.1 below. We find that the same car 
brand gains higher market share in markets where the brand has highly rated dealerships. 
As model 1 in Table 3.3 suggests, one unit increase in rating is equivalent to 0.93% 
increase in market share on average. Therefore, hypothesis 1a is confirmed.  
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Next we look at the moderating effect of service quality on the relationship 
between competition and market share. As suggested in model 4 in Table 3.1, higher 
service quality rating attenuates both the positive effect of internal network density and 
the negative effect of external network density. Models 2 and 3, present separate tests of 
these moderations effects. While, the moderation effect for END hold without inclusion 
of IND, the reverse is not true. We conclude, hypothesis 2 is weakly supported and 
hypothesis 3 is supported.  
We also test the robustness of results to several modeling choices. The results of 
robustness checks are reported in Table 3.4. We first include the second- and third-order 
terms for Rating to ensure that the interaction effects found for IND and END are not due 
to unmodeled non-linearity in Rating. As shown in models 1 and 2 the interaction effects 
are robust albeit the IND interaction becomes marginally significant (p=0.051 and 
p=0.099, respectively). Next we estimate the original models using maximum likelihood. 
Models 3 shows that the main effect of Rating is significant. Model 4 shows that 
interaction of Rating is significant with END but not with IND. Next we check how lack 
of competition in some markets affect results. Market share analysis has meaning only if 
there are alternative available to consumers. Therefore, we limit our sample to markets 
with at least two dealers of the focal brand and two dealers of competing brands. The 
results, as reported in models 5 and 6, remain significant. Finally, we test the assumption 
of normality on distribution of market share. We test the hypotheses using a logistic 
regression which satisfied the desirable property of limiting the distribution between 0 
and 1. As indicated in models 7 and 8 the main effect of Rating and the interaction effect 
of END are significant, while the interaction of IND is not.   
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Table 3.3. Random Effects Estimation Results 
Market Share 
Main 
Model 
IND 
Moderation 
END 
Moderation Full Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rating 0.934** 1.043* 0.211 0.423 
 (0.343) (0.449) (0.549) (0.550) 
IND 0.418*** 0.450*** 0.419*** 0.595*** 
 (0.029) (0.071) (0.029) (0.083) 
END -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.146*** -0.161*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017) 
Rating*IND  -0.007  -0.040* 
  (0.016)  (0.019) 
Rating*END   0.006* 0.010** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Land Area -3.030*** -3.030*** -3.033*** -3.034*** 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) 
Education -0.227* -0.227* -0.225* -0.228* 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
Family Income -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.423*** -0.421*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Age 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.342*** 0.343*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Pop. -0.036 -0.036 -0.039 -0.040 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) 
Commute Time 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Vehicles Owned 0.804* 0.801* 0.801* 0.786* 
 (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) 
Internet Pen. -0.599*** -0.599*** -0.598*** -0.601*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Comp. Rating -1.392* -1.390* -1.343* -1.307* 
 (0.579) (0.579) (0.579) (0.581) 
Constant 255.750*** 255.288*** 258.834*** 257.954*** 
 (13.485) (13.523) (13.589) (13.585) 
Make Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Class Dummies Y Y Y Y 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Date Dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 31884 31884 31884 31884 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001" 
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Table 3.4. Robustness Checks  
  Rating2 Rating3 MLE MLE Oligopoly Oligopoly GLM GLM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rating -3.824^ -35.216*** 0.890** 0.300 0.998** 0.539 0.047* -0.033 
 (2.102) (7.757) (0.339) (0.526) (0.344) (0.553) (0.019) (0.032) 
Rating2 0.563* 10.736***       
 (0.267) (2.435)       
Rating3  -1.006***       
  (0.240)       
IND 0.581*** 0.562*** 0.415*** 0.577*** 0.396*** 0.574*** 0.020*** 0.022** 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.026) (0.112) (0.029) (0.082) (0.002) (0.007) 
END -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.117*** -0.163*** -0.118*** -0.161*** -0.006*** -0.011*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.017) (0.000) (0.002) 
Rating*IND -0.037^ -0.033^  -0.036  -0.040*  -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.001) 
Rating*EN
D 0.009** 0.009*  0.010*  0.009**  0.001** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Land Area -3.023*** -3.046*** -3.010*** -3.014*** -3.464*** -3.468*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.100) (0.100) (0.203) (0.203) (0.016) (0.016) 
Education -0.229* -0.219* -0.230** -0.231** -0.253* -0.254* -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.089) (0.089) (0.099) (0.099) (0.004) (0.004) 
Family 
Income -0.419*** -0.424*** -0.422*** -0.420*** -0.430*** -0.428*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.341*** 0.344*** 0.349*** 0.352*** 0.395*** 0.398*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.068) (0.068) (0.077) (0.077) (0.004) (0.004) 
Pop. -0.039 -0.036 -0.008 -0.012 0.310 0.306 -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.215) (0.216) (0.156) (0.156) (0.222) (0.221) (0.019) (0.019) 
Commute 
Time 0.012 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.050 0.051 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.100) (0.100) (0.111) (0.111) (0.005) (0.005) 
Vehicles 
Owned 0.789* 0.801* 0.806* 0.789* 0.764* 0.746^ 0.043* 0.043* 
 (0.386) (0.387) (0.353) (0.353) (0.384) (0.384) (0.017) (0.017) 
Internet Pen. -0.601*** -0.607*** -0.603*** -0.604*** -0.554*** -0.556*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.073) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080) (0.004) (0.004) 
Comp. 
Rating -1.310* -1.349* -1.340** -1.257* -1.405* -1.325* -0.030 -0.026 
 (0.580) (0.580) (0.493) (0.494) (0.573) (0.575) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 
265.194**
* 
293.495**
* 
255.891**
* 
258.448**
* 
221.785**
* 
223.784**
* 
10.297**
* 
10.644**
* 
 (14.000) (15.639) (14.688) (14.784) (14.891) (14.986) (0.736) (0.745) 
Make 
Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Class 
Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State 
Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Date 
Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 31884 31884 31884 31884 31702 31703 31884 31884 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Post-Hoc Analyses 
In this section we will test additional hypotheses about moderating role of 
variation of dealer ratings, internet penetration and car class. Table 3.5 summarizes the 
results from post-hoc analyses. In models 1 we report results for moderation analysis of 
internet penetration when treated as a binary variable. We made a median split on internet 
penetration and interacted with Rating. The results show marginally significant results 
indicating that the effect of Rating is stronger in markets with higher internet penetration. 
In model 2, we perform a similar analysis except that we use the continuous form of 
internet penetration. This analysis does not confirm existence of a linear moderation. 
Model 3 reports the estimation results for the effect of variation of dealer ratings. We 
measure variation as the standard deviation of dealer ratings for a brand within a market 
and within a class. The results indicate that when variation is higher the effect of rating 
on market share is also stronger. Finally, in model 4 we look at the effect of product 
class. The result indicate that class as a whole is a significant moderator for Rating. 
Particularly, we see that the effect of Rating is stronger for lower-end cars while it 
becomes non-significant for luxury cars. 
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Table 3.5. Post-Hoc Analyses 
  Internet (binary) Internet Rating Variation Car Class 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rating 0.032 -4.025 0.309 1.703 
 (0.609) (5.114) (0.547) (1.452) 
IND 0.592*** 0.590*** 0.542*** 0.657*** 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085) 
Rating*IND -0.039* -0.039* -0.038* -0.053** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
END -0.152*** -0.154*** -0.149*** -0.171*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
Rating*END 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Internet Pen. (binary) -9.069**    
 (3.435)    
Rating*Internet Pen.(binary) 1.310^    
 (0.730)    
Internet Pen.  -0.857** -0.596*** -0.599*** 
  (0.304) (0.082) (0.081) 
broadband  0.000   
  (.)   
Rating*Internet Pen.  0.057   
  (0.065)   
Rating Variation   -7.465**  
   (2.735)  
Rating*Rating Variation   3.627***  
   (0.625)  
Subcompact Sedan    base 
     
Compact Sedan    -1.220 
    (1.527) 
Mid-Size Sedan    -0.530 
    (1.560) 
Mid-Size SUV    -1.895 
    (1.454) 
Full-Size Luxury    -6.886** 
    (2.481) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
N 31884 31884 31884 31884 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
+ Controls variables are not reported to conserve space; these variables are: Land Area, 
Education, Family Income, Age, Population, Commute Time, Vehicles Owned, 
Competitor Rating, Constant, and dummy variables for make, class, state and date.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
We set out to resolve a debate about the importance of dealership service 
performance for brand manufacturers’ market success. Our results demonstrate that 
consumers react positively to better service received from dealerships. This sends a 
message to brand manufacturers that it is not only the product itself that matters for their 
bottom line but also the quality of service offered by their dealership network.  
In addition, we find evidence confirming that service quality moderates the 
competitive effect of brand or rival market presence. These findings suggest that external 
competition .– manifested in a dense network of competing brand dealerships – matters 
more when quality of dealer network is low. This suggests that car manufacturers need to 
pay specific attention to their dealerships in markets where competitors are densely 
located. In this situation switching is easier for customers and lower performance of their 
dealer network will lead to loss of more market share.  
The results of the analysis also show that high dealer quality, neutralizes the 
benefit of brand presence – manifested in high network density for brands dealership. 
Abundance of dealerships of the same brand in proximity of each other makes internal 
switching easier for customers. However, this switching is only beneficial when the 
average quality of dealers is not high. In this situation, the negative effect of one dealer’s 
low performance will be absorbed by other dealerships in vicinity and this prevents the 
customer from switching to a different brand. This finding also has implications for 
managing dealership networks. Low performance is particularly detrimental to 
manufacturer’s market share when there are no compensating dealerships. Therefore, in 
   
110 
markets where the brand’s dealers are sparsely located, the quality performance of those 
dealers become more critical for the competitive fate of the brand.  
This study helps manufacturers gain understanding of the role played by their 
dealership network in their market performance. The study highlights the importance of 
services for manufacturing firms and carefully managing and developing dealership 
networks that support products. We extend servitization and product-service bundling 
literatures by studying an underserved area – franchised dealership model – in which 
manufacturing and service activities are performed by different but tightly connected 
entities. The franchised dealership model represents a tighter relationship compared to 
that of buyer-supplier arrangement.  
Our post-hoc analyses indicate that variation in dealer ratings is also an important 
factor. When variation is higher, the effect of low or high average rating is amplified. 
This finding can imply that dealers with extreme quality ratings either very high or very 
low might have stronger impact on market share that mediocre dealerships. In addition, 
we find strong evidence that importance of dealer network depends on the type of car. 
Particularly, for utility cars dealer rating is a significant predictor of market share while 
for luxury cars dealer rating does not matter. One explanation for this finding is that 
brand loyalty and variation in car features is stronger for higher-end products. Whereas, 
in lower-end car classes functionality of cars are increasingly similar and consumers also 
place lower weight on hedonic aspects of the car or brand identity which leads them to be 
more willing to switch brands for better service experience.  
The findings of this study should be viewed in light of its limitations. While the 
main effect of consumer rating of dealer network and the moderating effect of external 
   
111 
network density are robust to several modeling choices, we find that moderating effect of 
internal network density was not robust. Furthermore, we only observe the overall 
consumer ratings of dealerships. While we significant effect for ratings we are not able to 
disentangle the several factors that drive satisfaction and identify which one is more 
critical for market success of brands. Of particular interest is the distinction between sales 
and service activities. Dealerships perform very different roles during sales and after-
sales service. Consumer rating of those as well as their ultimate effect on brand market 
share is not clear. We are planning to categorize reviews based on the subject of rating, 
e.g., sales process, maintenance quality, speed, attitude, etc. This categorization will 
allow us identify and distinguish various dealer practices that influence automaker 
success at a more granular level. Another closely related limitation of this work is that we 
do not observe the specific practices and features of dealerships. Issues related to human 
resource, design, amenities, inventory and assortment planning can be other sources of 
gaining consumer satisfaction which we were not able to observe. Finally, we only 
scratch the surface in study of dealership network designs. We analyze the aggregate 
quality rating, internal network density and external network density. Understanding how 
intermediate choices of manufacturers in managing their dealership network, such as 
contract types, training, spare parts support, and recall management, can influence 
brand’s market success is also of significant importance which is not address by this 
study.  
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The population includes both service offering and non-service offering 
manufacturers. Service offering firms may also report zero service sales in some years. 
Therefore, there exist multiple types of zero observations on service sales (hereafter 
referred to as zeros) and careful treatment of these zeros is necessary. Zeros for non-
service offering manufacturers (type I) might represent a different population, since these 
manufacturers can be systematically different from their service offering counterparts. 
Within service offering firms, too, there exists different types of zeros. There are zeros 
that represent an inactive stage of services (type II): zeros before the firm starts service 
activity (the first year with positive service sales), and zeros after the firm completely 
stops service activity (the last year with positive service sales). Finally, a manufacturer 
that is actively selling services may experience a temporary halt of service activity (type 
III). These events are characterized by a period with zero observation between two 
periods with positive observation. In sum, these conditions create three types of zeros. 
Type I are zero observations for traditional pure manufacturers, Type II are zero 
observations representing inactive stage of service activity, i.e. before services are 
developed or after complete shutdown of services, and Type III are zero observations 
representing temporary halt of service activity. 
 
These types represent different positions along a continuum of service activity, 
from temporary halt to non-existence. By sequentially excluding these different cases 
from our sample, we can observe if the results of our hypotheses change. This approach 
leads to four different samples that we use in our analysis:  
• Sample I: all data (all positive and zero observations on service sales),  
• Sample II: all positive observations plus type II and type III zeros,  
• Sample III: all positive observations plus type III zeros,  
• Sample IV or the positive sample: only positive observations. 
Inclusion of different types of zeros may have consequences for the analysis as 
they may represent firms with distinctive characteristics or special conditions. For 
instance, firms with type I zeros only make things and never offer services; they pursue a 
purely product-focused strategy and have no service infrastructure or assets. By contrast, 
firms with type III zeros have a service arm that reports zero sales in a few years but sells 
services in most years. Mixing these two very different manufacturers may lead to 
inaccurate conclusions. It will also inflate the frequency of zero observations beyond 
what the negative binomial distribution would natural yield. Therefore, we initially 
remove the zero values to eliminate confounding effects due to various types of firms. 
This filtering gives the positive sample (sample IV) the highest level of data quality. 
Table A1, demonstrates that results still hold if any group of zeros are included in the 
sample.   
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Table A1. Robustness of the Main Effect to Inclusion of Zeros 
  Sample I Sample II Sample III 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-
1.343**
* 
-
1.237**
* 
-
1.143**
* 
-
1.428**
* 
-
1.344**
* 
-
1.198**
* 
-
1.315**
* 
-
1.194**
* 
-
0.983**
* 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) 
RDInt 0.047**
* 0.013 0.002 
0.054**
* 0.008 0.002 
0.060**
* 0.01 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Assets 0.010* 0.018** 0.011^ 0.050**
* 
0.056**
* 
0.050**
* 0.032** 
0.065**
* 
0.077**
* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) 
EMP 0.023**
* 
0.021**
* 
0.023**
* 
0.019**
* 
0.017**
* 
0.019**
* 
0.013**
* 
0.005* 0.005^ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 0.329**
* 
0.368**
* 
0.419**
* 
0.212**
* 
0.270**
* 
0.264**
* 
0.158** 0.184** 0.181** 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.052) (0.057) (0.05) (0.059) (0.066) 
ROS 0.025**
* 
0.001 -0.006 0.033**
* 
0 -0.005 0.039**
* 
0.004 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
SEMP 0.121 0.147 0.435**
* -0.267^ -0.151 0.219 -0.223 -0.249 -0.046 
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.118) (0.142) (0.154) (0.18) (0.175) (0.201) (0.232) 
Service 0.846**
* 
0.682**
* 
0.654**
* 
0.971**
* 
0.867**
* 
0.817**
* 
2.199**
* 
2.240**
* 
2.314**
* 
 (0.127) (0.143) (0.159) (0.142) (0.163) (0.183) (0.185) (0.207) (0.25) 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log 
Likelihood 
-72859 -62762 -53597 -32063 -27794 -23734 -21538 -18122 -15060 
AIC 145769 125573 107239 64176 55637 47515 43125 36291 30165 
BIC 145971 125764 107419 64358 55809 47677 43298 36454 30318 
N 24401 21293 18550 11002 9669 8469 7551 6561 5670 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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Given that different regression models have different assumptions and varying 
levels of robustness to violation of assumptions, we check the results under alternative 
models. As shown in Table A2, the main conclusion holds under various distributional 
assumptions.  
 
Table A2. Comparison of Results Under Various Models 
Patentsit+1 Poisson Negative 
Binomial 
Panel Poisson Panel Negative Binomial 
  
RE FE RE FE Hybrid+ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 4.190*** 3.932*** 4.198*** - # -1.328*** -1.237*** -1.457***  
(0.006) (0.185) (0.067) - (0.094) (0.095) (0.093) 
RDInt 0.061*** 0.037^ 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.031*  
(0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Assets 0.056*** 0.110^ 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.046*** 0.040** -0.018  
(0.000) (0.061) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) 
EMP 0.003*** 0.009 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.008^  
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
ROA 0.493*** 0.174* -0.014^ -0.015^ 0.118* 0.126* 0.003  
(0.006) (0.079) (0.008) (0.008) (0.051) (0.055) (0.057) 
ROS 0.053*** 0.039* 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.038*** 0.030** 0.018^  
(0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
SEMP 0.456*** 0.454 -0.044^ -0.049^ -0.200 -0.316^ -0.432^  
(0.008) (0.321) (0.026) (0.027) (0.177) (0.192) (0.240) 
Service 3.443*** 5.587*** 1.042*** 1.041*** 2.283*** 2.164*** 1.328***  
(0.007) (0.461) (0.020) (0.020) (0.192) (0.203) (0.224) 
Group  
Means 
- - - - - - Y 
Year  
Dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 7265 7265 7265 5234 7265 5234 7265 
Standard errors in parentheses; # this model does not have an intercept; ^ p<0.10; * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
+ A note on the Hybrid model: The negative binomial panel models developed by 
Hausman et al. (1984) are commonly used for modeling patent data. However, Allison 
and Waterman (2002) argue that Hausman et al.’s (1984) fixed effects negative binomial 
model controls for the fixed effects on the dispersion factor but not on the conditional 
mean, and therefore, does not fully control for the time-invariant covariates. They suggest 
estimating a random effects model with a fixed effect estimator embedded to avoid 
potential heterogeneity bias. This method (here referred to as the hybrid method) involves 
centering all time-varying regressors around the unit mean and entering the unit mean 
into the model. Effectively, the hybrid method separates the within-unit and between-unit 
effects, and provides the benefits of both fixed effects and random effects models. The 
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hybrid method is promising; however, its results should be treated with caution. Recent 
simulation studies have shown that in some cases, especially for non-linear models, it can 
produce biased results – although the observed biases have been small (Brumback, 
Dailey, Brumback, Livingston, & He, 2010; Goetgeluk & Vansteelandt, 2008).  
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Granger causality test is a data-driven method developed to investigate some 
aspects (i.e. the necessary conditions) of causality (Granger, 1969). The core idea of 
Granger causality is that if the variable X causes the variations in the variable Y, it is 
necessary that X contain unique information about Y not found in the past of Y or 
elsewhere. Consequently, the past values of X must be able to predict Y over and above 
the past values of Y and any other influential variable (Granger, 1988). In a regression 
context, a test of joint significance of the past values of X would be a direct test of 
Granger causality (Freeman, 1983). Of course, Granger causality does not imply true 
causality (by the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy); rather, it only establishes “predictive 
causality” – a necessary condition for true causality (Diebold, 2001). Following the 
literature (Stock & Watson, 2003; Wooldridge, 2012) we regressed our dependent 
variable on the multiple lagged values of itself as well as of the other regressors. The 
general form of the model is given below: 
 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓{𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑙 , 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 | 𝑙
= 1,2, … , 𝐿} 
Where, L is the number of lagged values included in the model for each regressor. 
Proper selection of lag number is important in testing Granger causality because 
including very few lags can lead to spurious significance and including too many lags 
reduces the power of the test. Wooldridge (2012) suggests that for annual data, typically 
1 or 2 lags are used. To cover a wide range of L values we estimated multiple models 
with values of L from 1 to 4. In each model, we tested the joint significance of lagged 
versions of Service. All the tests were significant (p<0.001) indicating that Service 
Granger-causes Patents. Engle and Granger (1987) also suggest first-differencing the 
variables (i.e. using changes instead of levels) prior to estimating regression models to 
ensure stationarity and improve accuracy of the test. Differencing increased the statistical 
significance in all models further confirming Granger causality. 
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APPENDIX D 
TRIANGULATION OF FINDINGS USING TEXT ANALYSIS 
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To triangulate our results, we measured service offering of manufacturers in a 
different way, using a distinct data set. We drew a random sample of 1000 manufacturing 
firms with full panels (i.e. for each sampled firm all available years were included) and 
employed computerized text analysis to the Business Description section of the firm’s 10-
K reports. Our metric for service offering was the frequency count of the word 
“service(s)” divided by the number of all words in that section. The assumption here is 
that the frequency with which a manufacturer mentions “service” in the business 
description is indicative of how important and significant services are for its business. 
Strategy investigation using text analysis on corporate filings has been used in business 
studies very recently (Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Li, Lundholm, & Minnis, 2013; 
Loughran & McDonald, 2011). For instance, Li et al. (2013) measures a firm’s 
competitive environment as the frequency of references to competition in the firm’s 10-K 
filing. For 647 firms, we found the corresponding 10-K filings in the Edgar database. 
Through various quality assurance steps, we had to eliminate several observations, e.g., 
due to inconsistent structure of the report leading to incorrect parsing. The final sample 
included 556 firms and 2770 firm-year observations.   
Word counts can be quite noisy, especially within a single limited document, and 
so we did not want to directly include the proportion into the model. Rather, we used a 
binary indicator, where the indicator was positive if the proportion was above the median 
proportion for the entire sample. Using this measure (instead of Service) in our random 
effects negative binomial models, we find that patent activity is stronger in the group 
with high frequency of the word “service” in their 10-K report (Table A3). Not 
surprisingly, using the textual measure the effect is weaker, but, the pattern of estimates 
confirms our previous results. We also used a three-level measure (with low, medium and 
high levels split based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles) instead of the binary variable and 
observed a similar pattern – medium and high frequencies of “service” were associated 
with higher number of patents.  
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Table A3. Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Using Textual Measure of 
Service Offering 
  Patentsit+1 Patentsit+2 Patentsit+3 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.694** -0.843* -0.190 
 (0.223) (0.420) (0.284) 
RDInt 0.090 -0.017 0.415 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.296) 
Assets -0.026 0.021 0.139 
 (0.042) (0.064) (0.104) 
EMP 0.035*** 0.023^ 0.020 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) 
ROA 0.166 0.371 0.278 
 (0.229) (0.298) (0.679) 
ROS 0.069 -0.016 0.341 
 (0.045) (0.038) (0.244) 
SEMP 1.234** 1.621** 1.398^ 
 (0.402) (0.512) (0.724) 
ServiceFreq 0.217^ 0.273* 0.171 
 (0.117) (0.133) (0.177) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y 
Log Likelihood -3464 -2475 -1697 
AIC 6969 4989 3432 
BIC 7079 5090 3522 
N 1421 1113 854 
Standard errors in parentheses; ^ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
